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ABSTRACT 
  This Article is a reflection on personal experience as well as an 
account of what has happened to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
in the most recent quarter century. It observes that the Supreme Court 
of the United States has assigned to itself a role in making procedural 
law inconsistent with the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 or any more-
recent utterance of Congress. This procedural law made by the Court 
is responsive to the desire of business interests to weaken the ability of 
citizens to enforce laws enacted to protect them from business 
misconduct. The Article concludes with the suggestion that Congress 
should now act to constrain the role of the Court and restore the 
ability of citizens to enforce their rights in civil proceedings in federal 
courts. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  Introduction: A First-Person Perspective ........................................599 
II.  The State of Federal Law in 1985....................................................601 
A. Federal Judicial Dockets ......................................................601 
B. The Relation of 1985 Dockets to the 1934 Act and 
Private Enforcement of Public Law....................................603 
 
Copyright © 2010 by Paul D. Carrington. 
 † Professor of Law, Duke University; Reporter, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, 
Judicial Conference of the United States, 1985–92. This Article was written for presentation to 
the 2010 Civil Litigation Review Conference held at Duke University School of Law by the 
Judicial Conference of the United States on May 10–11, 2010. Stephen Burbank, Dan 
Coquillette, Scott Dodson, George Liebmann, Daniel Meador, Dickson Phillips, Thomas Rowe, 
Steve Subrin, Judith Resnik, Gerald Tjoflat, and Michael Zimmerman contributed numerous 
helpful comments and suggestions. Special thanks to Jennifer Behrens for help with the 
documentation. 
CARRINGTON IN FINAL.DOC 11/29/2010  6:56:44 PM 
598 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:597 
C. The Deregulation Movement ..............................................606 
D. The Cost of Law Enforcement: Discovery.........................609 
E. The 1983 Amendments.........................................................611 
F. A Personal Experience: The Role of the Reporter...........614 
III.  Substantial Political Issues Confronted in Rulemaking: 
1985–1992 ......................................................................................615 
A. Issue 1: Congress and the Rules Enabling Act ..................615 
1. Proposals for Reform........................................................615 
2. Politicization and Transsubstantivity ..............................616 
3. Lobbying for Supersession ...............................................618 
B. Issue 2: Belated Amendment to Correct the 
Identification of a Defendant ..............................................619 
C. Issue 3: Rule 48 and Trial by Jury .......................................621 
IV.  Reforming the Discovery Rules: Mandatory Disclosure ............623 
A. The Text of Rule 35 ..............................................................623 
B. Localization............................................................................623 
C. Discovery Costs .....................................................................624 
D. The Task Force on Civil Justice: Justice for All.................624 
E. The Idea of Mandatory Disclosure .....................................626 
F. The Council on Competitiveness ........................................627 
G. Empirical Evaluation of Mandatory Disclosure................630 
H. Other Limitations: Rules 16, 30, and 33 .............................631 
I. My Personal Immortality .....................................................632 
J. The Continuing Dispute over Disclosure 
Requirements ........................................................................633 
V.  Rule 4 and Service of Process Abroad ...........................................635 
A. Formalities of Service ...........................................................635 
B. The Hague Convention and Formalities of  
Service Abroad......................................................................636 
C. Revision by the Court at the Suggestion of the  
British Embassy.....................................................................638 
VI.  The Hague Evidence Convention..................................................639 
A. The Aérospatiale Case ..........................................................639 
B. An Effort to Accommodate the Court’s Opinion and 
the Convention in Rule 26 ...................................................640 
VII.  Rule 11 Sanctions ...........................................................................640 
A. Abuses of Rule 11 .................................................................641 
B. Reforming Rule 11................................................................643 
C. Inherent Judicial Power........................................................644 
VIII.  The Supreme Court’s Role as Procedural Lawmaker: 
Rules 56 and 8...............................................................................645 
CARRINGTON IN FINAL.DOC 11/29/2010  6:56:44 PM 
2010] POLITICS AND CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES 599 
A. Rule 56: The 1986 Trilogy ....................................................645 
B. Revising Rule 56?..................................................................646 
C. The Decision to Amend Rule 50 but Not Rule 56 ............647 
D. Twombly: The Supreme Court Rewrites Rule 8 ...............648 
E. Substance, Not Mere Procedure? Consequences for 
Antitrust Law Enforcement.................................................650 
F. The Role of the Court in Legislating New  
Pleading Rules .......................................................................651 
G. Substantive Political Consequences....................................654 
H. Next Comes Iqbal..................................................................654 
I. Up with Deregulation! Down with Private  
Law Enforcement! ................................................................655 
J. Down with the Rulemaking Process? .................................656 
K. Consequences for State Law Enforcement ........................658 
IX.  Compare the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925.............................658 
A. Arbitration Law as Written by Congress ...........................658 
B. The Court Rewrites the Act.................................................660 
C. Rewriting Rules of Evidence ...............................................662 
D. A Captured Court .................................................................663 
X.  Prescriptions ......................................................................................664 
I.  INTRODUCTION: A FIRST-PERSON PERSPECTIVE 
This Article protests the lack of respect shown by the Supreme 
Court of the United States for the political process devised in 1934 by 
all three branches of the federal government to better suit rules of 
civil procedure to the protection and enforcement of legal rights in 
civil proceedings. Under that 1934 law,1 the Court has a specific but 
limited role in rulemaking. Congress also has a role. So do the 
Judicial Conference of the United States (Judicial Conference), and, 
at least indirectly, the Executive Branch. And so does the Federal 
Judicial Center, established in 1967 to provide empirical data 
informing rulemakers about the consequences of the rules for which 
they share responsibility. But in recent decades, the Supreme Court 
has manifested dissatisfaction with its modest share of the power to 
make procedural law and has in its opinions proclaimed new rules 
having no basis in texts enacted through the established rulemaking 
process or in any empirical data. 
 
 1. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 
(2006)). 
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The new procedural law made by the Court manifests political 
objectives and gives special meaning to the term “judicial activism.” 
Its creation weakens the enforcement of public laws by private 
citizens. It thus conforms to the deregulation or tort-reform politics 
favored by many business interests. 
As a sometime participant in the traditional rulemaking process, 
I seek in this Article to place the Court’s ventures in historical and 
political perspective. If, as I contend, the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (Civil Rules) should still be made by the process 
established in 1934 and now conducted by the Judicial Conference, it 
is imperative that Congress communicate to the Supreme Court its 
disapproval of the Court’s freewheeling rewriting of the Civil Rules. 
And the Senate might usefully place the issue on the agenda for 
Supreme Court nomination hearings. 
To advance this contention, I must first disclose my personal role 
in the events recorded here. I was quite surprised in 1985 to get a call 
from Chief Justice Burger offering me an appointment as Reporter to 
the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules (Advisory Committee). I 
probably owed that call to the influence of Professor Maurice 
Rosenberg, my sometime coconspirator in law reform and sometime 
coauthor.2 Professor Rosenberg tended to overrate my modest skill as 
a politician. And he was at the time an academic member of the 
Advisory Committee and was thus surely consulted by the Chief 
Justice in the selection of a new Reporter. The Chief was probably 
looking for political talent to help address the rising political stress on 
procedural rulemaking that had become a serious concern beginning 
in the 1970s.3 
That stress would continue through my tenure and beyond, 
evolving into the crisis that procedural rulemaking now faces in 2010 
as a result of the Court’s interventions.4 During my time on the staff 
 
 2. Professor Rosenberg was the chair of the Advisory Council on Appellate Justice, 1971–
1975 (funded by the Federal Judicial Center and Law Enforcement Assistance Administration) 
of which I was a member. We were coauthors of a book with Daniel J. Meador, PAUL D. 
CARRINGTON, DANIEL J. MEADOR & MAURICE ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL (1976), and 
I authored an obituary saluting his memory, Paul D. Carrington, Maurice Rosenberg, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 1901 (1995). 
 3. For a contemporaneous assessment of the political challenges facing the Supreme 
Court in the rulemaking process, see generally Jack H. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of 
the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 673 (1975). 
 4. For a compact account of the destabilizing impact of the revised pleading standard on 
the civil litigation system, see generally Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing 
Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821 (2010). 
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of the rulemakers, I participated in numerous controversies. I briefly 
recount these controversies in this Article to illuminate the 
rulemaking process with which Supreme Court Justices have 
increasingly manifested discontent. 
II.  THE STATE OF FEDERAL LAW IN 1985 
A. Federal Judicial Dockets 
One cause for rising political concern radiating through the 
federal judiciary in 1985 was the very substantial increase in the 
federal caseload over the preceding two decades.5 That increase had 
numerous causes.6 One was the growth of the criminal docket 
resulting from numerous extensions of federal criminal law.7 Larger 
criminal dockets stemmed in part from the then–newly proclaimed 
War on Drugs8 and in part from the enhancement of the procedural 
rights of the accused—most notably the advent of the right to 
counsel—resulting in more contested cases.9 Another cause was the 
substantial increase in the number of civil actions filed by citizens 
seeking enforcement of civil rights or civil liberties, especially those 
filed by prisoners attacking their convictions or invoking the newly 
established rights of citizens in prison.10 Other new categories of civil 
 
 5. The number of civil cases pending in district courts in 1965 was 74,395. WARREN 
OLNEY III, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE 
UNITED STATES COURTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1965, at 88 (1965). The 
comparable number in 1985 was 254,114. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL 
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 276 (1985). 
 6. For contemporaneous accounts of the many sources of the caseload increase, see 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 59–93 (1985); Wolf 
Heydebrand & Carroll Seron, The Rising Demand for Court Services: A Structural Explanation 
of the Caseload of U.S. District Courts, 11 JUST. SYS. J. 303, 313–20 (1986). 
 7. There were 31,569 criminal cases filed in 1965, OLNEY, supra note 5, at 88, and 10,834 
cases pending, id. at 89. There were 38,245 criminal cases filed in 1985, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE 
U.S. COURTS, supra note 5, at 336, and 22,229 cases pending, id. at 337. 
 8. The literature on this war is abundant. For an account of the War on Drugs attentive to 
its impact on the courts, see generally JAMES P. GRAY, WHY OUR DRUG LAWS HAVE FAILED 
AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT: A JUDICIAL INDICTMENT OF THE WAR ON DRUGS (2001). 
 9. See SHELDON KRANTZ ET AL., THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES: THE 
MANDATE OF ARGERSINGER V. HAMLIN 1 (1976) (noting that recognizing the right to counsel 
“placed significant new burdens on the criminal justice system”). 
 10. See generally DAVID RUDOVSKY, THE RIGHTS OF PRISONERS: THE BASIC ACLU 
GUIDE TO A PRISONER’S RIGHTS 21–22, 26–27 (1973) (summarizing the legal rights of prisoners 
at disciplinary hearings and to notice of rules governing prisoner conduct). 
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filings included employment discrimination cases11 and cases brought 
to enforce federal environmental laws.12 State supreme courts’ 
extensions of their states’ tort law to deter needless risk-taking by 
manufacturers and other business firms13 may also have contributed 
new diversity cases to federal court dockets. And there were perhaps 
more contract disputes between business firms engaged in interstate 
or international commerce. 
The Supreme Court’s 1977 decision establishing the right of 
lawyers to advertise their services may also have magnified the 
caseloads in state and federal courts.14 And the advent of electronic 
information storage perhaps began to elevate the relative cost of 
discovery in some big commercial cases in the 1980s.15 
Most of these docket developments were linked to President 
Lyndon Johnson’s search for the Great Society,16 a search that might 
have been better and more moderately labeled a search for a Middle 
Class Society. Great Society politics were a continuation of 
Progressive and New Deal politics, which had long aimed to increase 
and enforce the rights of citizens by providing equal protection to 
all.17 These politics were, at least in part, a continuing reaction against 
 
 11. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in 
Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 115–17 (2009). For 
information about the disfavor that these cases have come to arouse among federal appellate 
judges, see id. at 112–15. 
 12. See generally JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
AND POLICY 77–79 (3d ed. 2010) (“Every major federal environmental law passed since 1970 
. . . has contained a citizen suit provision.”). 
 13. Instrumental in extensions of tort law were WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE 
LAW OF TORTS (1st ed. 1941), and published opinions of the California Chief Justice Roger 
Traynor. BEN FIELD, ACTIVISM IN PURSUIT OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE JURISPRUDENCE 
OF CHIEF JUSTICE ROGER J. TRAYNOR, at xiv, 105–06 (2003). 
 14. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 379 (1977). For an account of the extension of the right 
to advertise, see 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF LAWYER ADVERTISING 85–110 (2006). For a 
compact assessment of the consequences of the decision, see generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., 
Advertising and Intermediaries in Provision of Legal Services: Bates in Retrospect and Prospect, 
37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 307 (2005). 
 15. See Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J. 
561, 564–65 (2001) (discussing the impact of computer technology on litigation and the new and 
unforeseen costs and burdens of electronic discovery). 
 16. For a full account of the Great Society, see generally THE GREAT SOCIETY AND THE 
HIGH TIDE OF LIBERALISM (Sidney M. Milkis & Jerome M. Mileur eds., 2005). 
 17. Multiple commentators have provided accounts of political developments prior to the 
Great Society. See, e.g., MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD, PEACEFUL REVOLUTION: CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE AND AMERICAN CULTURE FROM PROGRESSIVISM TO THE NEW DEAL (2000); 
MAUREEN A. FLANAGAN, AMERICA REFORMED: PROGRESSIVES AND PROGRESSIVISMS 1890–
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the Industrial Revolution–inspired anarchism and Marxism that 
flourished in America during the economic crisis of the 1930s.18 And 
they generally had the support of a vibrant labor movement. 
B. The Relation of 1985 Dockets to the 1934 Act and Private 
Enforcement of Public Law 
The Great Society–inspired increases to federal court caseloads 
were not entirely coincidental to the vision of civil procedure 
embodied in the 1934 Rules Act.19 The aim of that reform, first 
vigorously advanced in the United States at the federal level by the 
early-twentieth-century Progressives, was to enforce all the legal 
rights of citizens, whether derived from legislation or from state and 
federal constitutions.20 The Progressives, in turn, drew their ideas 
from thoughts being expressed throughout the nineteenth century21 
and perhaps from earlier thoughts attributed to the Protestant 
 
1920 (2007); WILL MORRISEY, THE DILEMMA OF PROGRESSIVISM: HOW ROOSEVELT, TAFT, 
AND WILSON RESHAPED THE AMERICAN REGIME OF SELF-GOVERNMENT (2009). 
 18. See generally PAUL AVRICH, ANARCHIST VOICES: AN ORAL HISTORY OF ANARCHISM 
IN AMERICA (1995) (compiling oral histories of anarchists in the United States); COMMUNISM IN 
AMERICA: A HISTORY IN DOCUMENTS (Albert Fried ed., 1997) (compiling a broad range of 
documents on the history of American Communism); ALONZO VAN DEUSEN, RATIONAL 
COMMUNISM: THE PRESENT AND FUTURE REPUBLIC OF NORTH AMERICA (New York, Soc. 
Sci. Publ’g Co. 1885) (defending communism against its critics and articulating a vision of a 
communist society). 
 19. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 
(2006)). 
 20. The evolution of the politics of twentieth-century law reform can be traced back to the 
natural rights movement. See generally JUSTICE: A READER (Michael J. Sandel ed., 2007) 
(compiling classic and modern readings on human rights and philosophy); THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS (Patrick Hayden ed., 2001) (same). From there, progressivism and populism 
played a critical role in American political development. See generally ROBERT WYNESS 
MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1952) 
(surveying the historical progression of procedural rules in English and American courts); 
WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR UNIONS 
CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890–1937 (1994) (chronicling the impact on judicial behavior of the 
judicial-reform efforts between 1890 and 1937). For a more-focused discussion of the relation 
between the Progressives’ vision of reform and the Rules Enabling Act, see EDWARD A. 
PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL 
POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 28–
33 (2000); Charles E. Clark & James Wm. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure: I. The 
Background, 44 YALE L.J. 387 (1935). 
 21. See J. Newton Fiero, Report of Committee on Uniformity of Procedure and 
Comparative Law, 19 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 411, 436–38 (1896) (“[A]uthorizing judges . . . to 
select . . . lawyers familiar with the procedure in this and other countries . . . [to draft simplified 
procedural rules] will give an opportunity for a close, careful and painstaking investigation into 
the methods of procedure . . . [used] throughout the English speaking world . . . .”). 
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Enlightenment, which emphasized the role of the individual 
celebrant.22 In the twentieth century, Progressive ambitions gained the 
vigorous support of the newly well-organized legal profession. 
The American idea of engaging judges in the crafting of 
procedural law had a nineteenth-century English origin.23 In the 
twentieth century, the American Bar Association (ABA) took up the 
cause and secured the passage of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934,24 
which granted the judicial branch authority to craft procedural rules.25 
The aims of those who wrote the 1934 statute and of the Advisory 
Committee that wrote the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure26 
were expressed in Rule 1: “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action.”27 The rules were, at last, to facilitate 
the assertion of civil claims and assure that meritorious claims based 
on discoverable facts were promptly recognized and enforced. The 
right to discover evidence would become a key feature transforming 
federal courts into effective instruments of public civil law 
enforcement.28 
The 1938 Civil Rules were the product of a committee of 
eminent lawyers led by Homer Cummings, the attorney general of the 
United States, and served by Charles Clark of the Yale Law School. 
 
 22. For recent accounts of the significance of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
Protestant thought, see WAYNE HUDSON, ENLIGHTENMENT AND MODERNITY: THE ENGLISH 
DEISTS AND REFORM (2009) (making a revisionist argument for the significance of the English 
deists in the Protestant Enlightenment); KIERON O’HARA, THE ENLIGHTENMENT: A 
BEGINNER’S GUIDE (2010) (describing the history and ideas of the Enlightenment and their 
impact). 
 23. See SAMUEL ROSENBAUM, THE RULE-MAKING AUTHORITY IN THE ENGLISH 
SUPREME COURT 1–6 (1917). 
 24. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 
(2006)). 
 25. See generally Charles E. Clark, Edson Sunderland and the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 58 MICH. L. REV. 6 (1959) (eulogizing Edson Sutherland and his role in shaping the 
Civil Rules on the Supreme Court’s Advisory Committee); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity 
Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. 
PA. L. REV. 909 (1987) (examining the triumph of equity rules over the common law and its 
implications for contemporary civil procedure). 
 26. For a brief but illuminating account of the beginnings of the Civil Rules, see CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 426–32 (5th ed. 1994). 
 27. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. For suggested reform to this rule, see Robert G. Bone, Improving 
Rule 1: A Master Rule for the Federal Rules, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 287 (2010). 
 28. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors of 
Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529, 535–37 (2001); Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: 
The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 739–40 
(1998). 
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The committee solicited public comment, which enabled it to see the 
diverse ramifications of proposed texts. This political process had 
several virtues: transparency, disinterest, access to advice and 
empirical data, and a measure of accountability to all three branches 
of government.29 The Supreme Court has explicitly acknowledged 
these merits twice in recent times,30 but the present Justices seem, at 
least at times,31 to have overlooked them. 
To the extent that the Progressive reformers achieved their aims, 
private citizens gained the ability to enforce many diverse laws 
enacted or proclaimed to protect public interests as well as their own. 
In recognition of that reality, by the 1960s, the United States was 
moving away from the New Deal reliance on administrative agencies 
to protect the public interest from harms caused by risky business 
practices.32 Related to this evolution was the growing awareness that 
government agencies assigned to protect the public from harms 
caused by the indifference or greed of business interests have a 
tendency, over time, to be captured by the very interests they were 
organized to regulate.33 Citizens represented by their own private 
lawyers are generally less vulnerable to such capture than are public 
officials. This sometimes-costly scheme of business regulation is 
imposed ex post. Business decisionmakers without administrative 
oversight are freer to take risks in search of profits but are more 
exposed to adverse consequences than if they were regulated ex ante 
 
 29. On the subsequent evolution of the process, see Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted 
Mirror: The Supreme Court’s Shimmering View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the 
Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 181–92 (1988). 
 30. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 595 (1998) (“[Q]uestions regarding pleading, 
discovery, and summary judgment are most frequently and most effectively resolved either by 
the rulemaking process or the legislative process.”); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics 
Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (“[Changes to the rules] must be 
obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.”). 
 31. See infra Part VIII. 
 32. For a definitive essay on public law litigation, see Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge 
in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976). I have made this point about the shift 
to enforcing laws through the courts more elaborately in Paul D. Carrington, A New 
Confederacy? Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45 DUKE L.J. 929, 933–44 (1996). Chayes’s 
essay may be seen as a reflection of legal process theory and the thinking of Lon Fuller and 
others critical of the cynicism of legal realism. For a critique of legal realism written 
contemporaneously with the Rules Enabling Act, see L.L. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 
U. PA. L. REV. 429 (1934). For a modern elaboration, see Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller’s Theory 
of Adjudication and the False Dichotomy Between Dispute Resolution and Public Law Models of 
Litigation, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1273 (1995). 
 33. James Landis penned a striking assessment of the capture problem. See JAMES M. 
LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT (1960). 
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by public officers. A nation that often eschews the idea of strong or 
intrusive government may require this form of business regulation to 
constrain harmful business practices. 
For these reasons and perhaps others,34 both states and the 
federal government embraced civil litigation conducted pursuant to 
the Civil Rules as envisioned in the 1930s.35 By the 1960s, this form of 
litigation had become in many minds a preferred form of regulating 
business in the public interest. This sense of public purpose led the 
Judicial Conference to propose and secure the creation of the Federal 
Judicial Center in 1967,36 in the hope that the data it might gather 
would inform rulemakers and result in procedural rules becoming 
more efficient instruments for the enforcement of public laws and 
citizens’ legal rights. This improved enforcement would, the Judicial 
Conference hoped, modify businesses’ behavior, making our social 
order more just.37 
C. The Deregulation Movement 
A countervailing political force arose to resist this form of 
privatized business regulation. That force finds its roots in Adam 
Smith’s eighteenth-century celebration of the free market as a source 
 
 34. Others may attribute the development to the influence of “rent-seeking” lawyers, issue-
group interests, budget constraints, or party politics. See Sean Farhang, Public Regulation and 
Private Lawsuits in the American Separation of Powers System, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 821, 826–28 
(2008). 
 35. See John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 354, 
383 (2003) (concluding that the trend toward greater state conformity with the Civil Rules had 
reversed itself); John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey 
of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L REV. 1367, 1427 (1986) (noting that the 
rules of civil procedure in twenty-three of fifty-one jurisdictions were replicas of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and a substantial majority of jurisdictions used a system at least 
substantially similar to the federal rules). 
 36. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 620–629 (2006) (establishing the Federal Judicial Center). For a 
history of the Center, see Denise L. Arial, History of the Federal Judiciary: The Federal Judicial 
Center, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/landmark_18.html (last 
visited Oct. 23, 2010). 
 37. Kenneth E. Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 937, 938–40 
(1975) (describing the “Behavior Modification Model” as a way of imposing costs on individuals 
to alter behavioral choices). See generally Owen M. Fiss, The Social and Political Foundations of 
Adjudication, 6 J.L. & HUM. BEHAV. 121 (1982) (critiquing the dispute resolution model of 
adjudication and describing the importance of structural reform litigation focusing on large 
organizations). Professor Terence Halliday observed that Max Weber had celebrated this 
American impulse to rationalize legal institutions as the essence of Western culture. TERENCE 
C. HALLIDAY, BEYOND MONOPOLY: LAWYERS, STATE CRISES, AND PROFESSIONAL 
EMPOWERMENT 23–26 (1987). 
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of public good38 and has sometimes been led by lawyers whose careers 
are invested in representing business interests.39 Advocates of 
deregulation often discount the many risks to distant others that 
result from business practices extended over substantial distances. 
But as Adam Smith himself observed,40 business decisionmakers are 
disinclined to bear costs to diminish risks to distant workers, 
consumers, investors, passengers, patients, franchisees, tenants, or 
others. 
Deregulation became the battle cry of business interests such as 
those represented by the United States Chamber of Commerce.41 One 
form of deregulation politics challenged the procedural reforms that 
enabled private citizens to enforce diverse claims—and coincidentally 
to enforce sundry public laws. Advocates of this kind of deregulation 
urged that the costs and delays of excessive litigation were disabling 
American businesses from competing in the global economy that our 
nation aspired to enlarge.42 The available data on the growth in the 
 
 38. See generally ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS (R.H. Campbell, A.S. Skinner & W.B. Todd eds., Clarendon Press reprt. 
1979) (1776) (advocating an economic system of natural liberty). 
 39. See Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the 
Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 1000 (2000). 
 40. See ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 135–37 (D.D. Raphael & 
A.L. Macfie eds., Liberty Classics 1982) (1759) (recounting the relative indifference of his 
Glasgow neighbors to distant tragedies); see also DOĞAN GÖÇMEN, THE ADAM SMITH 
PROBLEM: RECONCILING HUMAN NATURE AND SOCIETY IN THE THEORY OF MORAL 
SENTIMENTS AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (2007) (examining the contrasting conception of 
human nature in Adam Smith’s two most noted works). 
 41. See generally IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: 
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992) (elaborating on the interconnectedness 
of regulation and free markets); M.E. BEESLEY, PRIVATIZATION, REGULATION AND 
DEREGULATION (1997) (providing a collection of essays on the economic effects of 
privatization and regulation); DEREGULATION OR RE-REGULATION? REGULATORY REFORM 
IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (Giandomenico Majone ed., 1990) (assessing 
developments in regulation in Europe and America, exploring the implications of European 
Community regulation, and analyzing the political economy of regulation); WILLIS EMMONS, 
THE EVOLVING BARGAIN: STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF DEREGULATION AND 
PRIVATIZATION (2000) (describing how new forms of regulation can come with market 
reforms); ALAN SHIPMAN, THE MARKET REVOLUTION AND ITS LIMITS: A PRICE FOR 
EVERYTHING (1999) (analyzing the free market worldwide after the “Market Revolution” and 
discussing the continuing existence of regulation); DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH STANISLAW, THE 
COMMANDING HEIGHTS: THE BATTLE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND THE MARKETPLACE 
THAT IS REMAKING THE MODERN WORLD (1998) (describing the shift toward more open 
markets). 
 42. Stephen J. Carroll provides a contemporaneous assessment of the ways the American 
liability system limits U.S. competition abroad. See STEPHEN J. CARROLL WITH NICHOLAS 
PACE, ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF TORT REFORM 35–36 (1987); see also GUSTAVE H. 
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civil dockets of the federal courts, however, substantially weakened 
the argument: there was remarkable growth in the number of cases, 
but much of the growth was in prisoner complaints and other pro se 
cases.43 In Judge Jack Weinstein’s words, the business community’s 
stated concerns about case overload were a “weapon of perception, 
not substance.”44 
Nevertheless sensitive to business complaints, Chief Justice 
Burger in 1976 had called for a national conference in his hometown 
of St. Paul to honor Roscoe Pound, a law reformer in his time. 
Pound’s address to the ABA at that place in 190645 had invigorated 
the political efforts of the ABA that had resulted in the 1934 Rules 
Enabling Act.46 Although the conference’s primary consequence was 
to stimulate the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) movement,47 
there was a shared sense that 1979 was a time to consider more 
reform. Chief Justice Burger had by then reduced the number of 
 
SHUBERT, SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE NEED FOR TORT REFORM 11 (1986) (describing 
various problems with the civil justice system including the disadvantages of vacillation between 
a purely compensatory system and a fault-based liability system); LOUIS HARRIS & ASSOCS., 
PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND TORT LAW REFORM 3 (1987) 
(providing a survey showing that Americans think the civil justice system is overused and the 
problem is growing). 
 43. See Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 17 (1986) 
(explaining that “five categories of cases—recovery of overpayments, social security cases, 
prisoner petitions, torts, and civil rights cases—account for almost three-quarters of the entire 
increase in filings”); see also Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the 
“Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and 
Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 989–90 (2003) (arguing that the growth in 
number of cases was due, in part, to the provision of legal services to those previously unable to 
obtain representation). 
 44. Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the 
Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1909 (1989). 
 45. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 
14 AM. LAW. 445 (1906); see also Barry Friedman, Popular Dissatisfaction with the 
Administration of Justice: A Retrospective (and a Look Ahead), 82 IND. L.J. 1193, 1193 (2007) 
(providing a retrospective analysis of Pound’s speech). 
 46. See THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 289–94 (A. 
Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979) (describing the short-term and long-term effects of 
Pound’s speech). See generally William H. Erickson, The Pound Conference Recommendations: 
A Blueprint for the Justice System in the Twenty-First Century, 76 F.R.D. 277 (1978) 
(summarizing Pound’s recommendations and noting the work done to respond to his concerns). 
 47. In 2006, the International Academy of Mediators awarded Frank Sander a medal for 
his efforts beginning at that conference. Awards, INT’L ACAD. OF MEDIATORS, http://
www.iamed.org/awards.cfm (last visited Oct. 25, 2010). See generally Michael L. Moffitt, Before 
the Big Bang: The Making of an ADR Pioneer, 22 NEGOTIATION J. 437, 437–39 (2006) 
(providing a brief biography of Frank Sander). 
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lawyers and professors engaged in civil rulemaking so that the 
Advisory Committee was dominated by the judges that he selected.48 
Champions of the deregulation cause acquired substantial 
control of the federal government in the elections of 1980.49 And in 
the era following those elections, business interests recognizing the 
political role of the judiciary and seeking deregulation secured 
appointment of a controlling majority of Supreme Court Justices and 
federal judges.50 Especially after the appointments of Chief Justice 
John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito by President George W. Bush, 
the Court’s work has evidenced a probusiness shift that seems to have 
magnified the Court’s demonstrated inclination to weaken private 
enforcement of public laws regulating business.51 
D. The Cost of Law Enforcement: Discovery 
Cost is, of course, an ancient grievance against law.52 But business 
interests’ complaints were often directed specifically at the costs 
associated with the discovery process that was the central, 
distinguishing feature of civil procedure under the 1938 Civil Rules.53 
 
 48. See Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1677, 1714–15 (2004) (explaining Chief Justice Warren Burger’s impact 
on the selection of Advisory Committee members). 
 49. See ANDREW E. BUSCH, REAGAN’S VICTORY: THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1980 
AND THE RISE OF THE RIGHT 98–144 (2005) (detailing the general election of 1980); MICHAEL 
KAZIN, THE POPULIST PERSUASION: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 245–68 (1995) (providing an 
illuminating account of the relation of the deregulation movement to American populism). 
 50. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA M. ELLMAN & ANDRES SAWICKI, ARE 
JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 127–28 (2006) 
(describing a conservative move in the Supreme Court after 1980 but showing the challenges of 
documenting that trend in lower federal courts). 
 51. See Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court: 
Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1531–32 (2008) 
(elaborating on the probusiness nature of a majority of Supreme Court cases during the October 
Term of 2006); see also A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 353, 353 (2010) (employing the less-aggressive term “restrictive ethos” to denote 
the Court’s transformative political aims). 
 52. Learned Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials to Reach the Heart of the Matter, in 3 
LECTURES ON LEGAL TOPICS 87, 89 (1926) (“[I]n the third millennium before Christ men were 
complaining about the inefficiency of legal procedure, and I fancy that if any of you are destined 
in the year 7000 A.D. to revisit . . . you will be obliged to report . . . that mankind still exhibits 
the same discontentment with its methods of adjusting human differences . . . .”). 
 53. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37; cf. GEORGE RAGLAND, DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL (1932) 
(discussing professional experiences of administering discovery in pretrial procedure). See 
generally Subrin, supra note 28 (giving the historical context of the 1938 Civil Rules concerning 
discovery). For background on the development of practice under these rules, see generally 
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These discovery rules had enabled many citizens and firms to conduct 
private investigations of business practices threatening harm to 
consumers, passengers, tenants, workers, patients, or franchisees. As 
Judge Weinstein observed, the motives of many of those seeking 
reform of discovery practice were primarily substantive rather than 
procedural: they sought economic advancement, perhaps especially 
their own, if at the cost of decreasing civil justice.54 Some critics 
believed that business interests were concerned more with the reality 
that defendants were losing cases because facts were exposed by 
partisan discovery than with the costs of discovery in the cases that 
defendants were winning. Perhaps most unwelcome to business 
interests was the cost of complying with laws that private plaintiffs, 
armed with the right to investigate facts in dispute, were enforcing. 
It bears notice that the alleged costly overuse of discovery might 
also have been related to the entrenchment, in the third quarter of 
the twentieth century, of business litigators’ practice of billing for 
their services by the hour. This practice created a strong incentive in 
big-stakes cases for lawyers to leave no discovery stone unturned.55 
Another factor in rising costs was the increasing use of expert 
testimony, which had the secondary effect of engaging more of 
lawyers’ time in studying subjects of expertise and examining 
prospective witnesses and their data.56 By 1980, the available data 
indicated that the problem of excessive use of discovery was—though 
sometimes severe—largely a feature of big commercial cases in which 
lawyers were billing heavily for their time. Abuse was less likely in 
 
WILLIAM A. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1968) (detailing 
the debate over whether discovery rules have improved the adversary system). 
 54. Jack B. Weinstein, Procedural Reform as a Surrogate for Substantive Law Revision, 59 
BROOK. L. REV. 827, 828–29 (1993) (“The procedural reforms of the 1930s would have been 
only of passing interest had they not been accompanied and followed by the vast expansion of 
federal substantive law that resulted from the . . . growth and liberalization of the common law 
in areas such as torts and contracts.”). 
 55. See generally WILLIAM G. ROSS, THE HONEST HOUR: THE ETHICS OF TIME-BASED 
BILLING BY ATTORNEYS (1996) (discussing the ethical issues that arise from the billable-hour 
system). 
 56. Whether this profligate use of opinion testimony has enhanced the quality of decisions 
has seldom been examined. See generally Peter Huber, Medical Experts and the Ghost of 
Galileo, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119 (Summer 1991) (discussing the courts’ 
overinclusiveness of dubious expert testimony); Deborah R. Hensler, Science in the Court: Is 
There a Role for Alternative Dispute Resolution, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 171 (Summer 
1991) (addressing whether alternative dispute resolution could help courts deal with scientific 
questions in cases). 
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cases carrying lesser financial consequences, such as civil rights 
litigation.57 
E. The 1983 Amendments 
In 1983, the Court, acting on the advice of the Judicial 
Conference and with the assent of Congress, promulgated numerous 
revisions of the Civil Rules. Some of the 1983 amendments 
specifically responded to the concerns expressed by business interests 
and provided judges with “a blueprint for management” of big cases58 
to constrain abuses of discovery.59 The Court also promulgated an 
amendment to Rule 11 that authorized judges to punish lawyers for 
advancing meritless contentions that wasted the courts’ attention and 
their adversaries’ money.60 
The idea of managerial judging, as envisioned by these 1983 
amendments, emerged in the early 1970s at training seminars for 
rookie federal judges, and that first evolved at a time when the 
federal criminal and prisoner-petition caseloads were growing 
dramatically.61 Case management entailed increased engagement of 
 
 57. See generally JOSEPH L. EBERSOLE & BARLOW BURKE, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
DISCOVERY PROBLEMS IN CIVIL CASES 18–29 (1980) (discussing the issue of over-discovery); 
Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers’ Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal Problems 
and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 787 (providing lawyers’ views on the discovery 
system); Wayne D. Brazil, Improving Judicial Controls over the Pretrial Development of Civil 
Actions: Model Rules for Case Management and Sanctions, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 873 
(proposing a model rule for pretrial actions and modifications to the Advisory Committee’s 
proposed revisions of Rule 16); Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A 
Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295 (1978) [hereinafter Brazil, Adversary 
Character] (arguing that the adversarial nature of discovery impedes the actual discovery 
process); David L. Shapiro, Some Problems of Discovery in an Adversary System, 63 MINN. L. 
REV. 1055 (1979) (examining the gap between the theory and practice of discovery); David M. 
Trubek, Austin Sarat, William L.F. Felstiner, Herbert M. Kritzer & Joel B. Grossman, The 
Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72 (1983) (analyzing the amount of time and 
money spent in processing litigation). 
 58. ARTHUR R. MILLER, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE 
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND 
LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY 20 (1984). 
 59. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment (“Excessive 
discovery . . . pose[s] significant problems.”). 
 60. See id. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment (“Greater attention by the 
district courts to pleading and motion abuses and the imposition of sanctions when appropriate, 
should discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and help to streamline the litigation process by 
lessening frivolous claims or defenses.”). 
 61. See Judith Resnik, Changing Practices, Changing Rules: Judicial and Congressional 
Rulemaking on Civil Juries, Civil Justice, and Civil Judging, 49 ALA. L. REV. 133, 176–77 (1997) 
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judges in the conduct of pretrial proceedings for the purpose of 
preventing wasteful discovery.62 The Federal Judicial Center provided 
guidance in the available case-management methods.63 Contrary to 
occasional protests, managerial practices seem to have worked 
reasonably well in the big cases for which they were designed.64 And 
the Supreme Court did not express misgivings about the adequacy of 
the practice to control the excessive infliction of costs on adversaries 
until 2007.65 
Business interests’ complaints regarding the cost of pretrial 
litigation in commercial and public law cases seem to have been 
substantially overblown. A 2009 study by the Federal Judicial Center 
confirms that, with the exception of a very few outlying cases, the cost 
of discovery and related pretrial proceedings is minor in relation to 
the stakes in the cases, ranging from 1.6 percent to 3.3 percent of the 
amounts in dispute.66 
But case management was nevertheless not without critics.67 
Judges increasingly delegated managerial tasks to growing staffs of 
magistrates and clerks,68 perhaps because the tasks were sometimes 
deemed tedious and unworthy of the valued attention of judges 
 
(discussing judicial education on judges’ managerial roles and the beneficial aspects of 
promoting freely negotiated settlements). 
 62. See generally WILLIAM W SCHWARZER, MANAGING ANTITRUST AND OTHER 
COMPLEX LITIGATION: A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES (1982) (elaborating on the 
necessity for judicial involvement in antitrust and complex litigation cases); Robert F. Peckham, 
A Judicial Response to the Cost of Litigation: Case Management, Two-Stage Discovery Planning 
and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 253, 253–54 (1985) (discussing the 
importance of judicial management of the pretrial process). 
 63. See generally MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) (1985) (outlining the 
basic principles of complex litigation resolution and various procedures to successfully 
implement these principles). 
 64. See EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., NATIONAL, 
CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 12–13 (2009). 
 65. Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 
IOWA L. REV. 873, 898–99 (2009) (“Until Twombly, the Supreme Court had never openly and 
directly questioned the effectiveness of judicial discretion in managing litigation problems 
during the pre-trial phase.”). 
 66. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 64, at 2. 
 67. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376, 380 (1982) 
(“[M]anagerial judging may be redefining sub silentio our standards of what constitutes rational, 
fair, and impartial adjudication.”). 
 68. See Patrick E. Higginbotham, A Few Thoughts on Judicial Supremacy: A Response to 
Professors Carrington and Cramton, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 637, 648 (2009) (“The federal 
appellate courts also deploy large numbers of staff council and hand off administrative tasks to 
court clerks and circuit executives with their swelling staffs.”). 
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appointed “for life,” or because Congress was not providing adequate 
resources to deal with the caseloads.69 And parties faced increasing 
pressure to settle or arbitrate, perhaps contributing to the present 
state of affairs in which the public trial has largely vanished.70 Law is 
presumably still being enforced in civil cases in federal courts, but it is 
harder for us to see it happening in our vacant federal courtrooms.71 
The 1983 amendments facilitating judicial case management 
were not sufficient to calm the unrest of those who saw themselves as 
present or prospective defendants in civil cases. Business interests 
continued to agitate for a revision of Rule 68 to deter parties from 
refusing offers of judgment by exposing them to liability for 
attorneys’ fees; this device would enable defendants to elevate the 
pressure on plaintiffs to accept low early offers.72 Critics saw the 
proposal as a device to weaken recently enacted civil rights law.73 At 
its first public meeting in 1986, the Advisory Committee permanently 
tabled this proposed revision of Rule 68.74 
 
 69. Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of 
Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 929–30 (2000) (“These policies entailed development of the 
concepts of the federal courts as a distinctive and unique venue, of life-tenured judges as 
hierarchically superior to but able to share jurisdiction with non-life-tenured ‘federal’ judges, 
and of the judicial branch as appropriately advising Congress and the country about whether to 
locate enforcement of new rights in the federal courts.”). 
 70. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in 
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 515–16 (2004) (explaining that 
courts have seen a decrease in both the percentages and the total number of cases that go to 
trial). The extent to which the expanded role of Rule 56 contributed to the phenomenon is 
questionable. Compare Martin Redish, Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trials: 
Implications of the Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1330 (2005) (“Changes in the law 
of summary judgment quite probably explain at least a large part of the dramatic reduction in 
federal trials.”), with Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trial and Summary Judgment in Federal 
Civil Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 608–
09 (2004) (detailing the use of summary judgment to create pressure to settle a case). 
 71. See generally Patrick E. Higginbotham, The Present Plight of the United States District 
Courts, 60 DUKE L.J. 745 (2010) (discussing the decline of trials in the district courts and the 
subsequent effects on the administration of justice). 
 72. For an account of the history of this device, see Robert G. Bone, “To Encourage 
Settlement”: Rule 68, Offers of Judgment and the History of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
102 NW. U. L. REV. 1561, 1562 (2008). 
 73. See Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641, 
2641 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006)) (stating that in civil rights cases “the 
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a 
reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs”). For recent comment on Rule 68, see Bone, 
supra note 72, at 1608–10 (describing the controversy over the 1983 amendment proposal to 
Rule 68). 
 74. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, FED. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 
MEETING OF APRIL 21, 1986, MINUTES OF MEETING 1, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
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F. A Personal Experience: The Role of the Reporter 
It was in this political arena that I was privileged to serve the 
Advisory Committee as its Reporter. I worked for seven years with 
four chairs of the Advisory Committee—Judges Frank Johnson, Joe 
Weis, Frank Grady, and Sam Pointer—each of whom I admired as 
the sort of judge one would seek when one’s life, business, or assets 
were at stake in a courtroom. All were strongly committed to the 
aims expressed in Rule 1: enforcing all legal rights as fully, as 
efficiently, and as quickly as circumstances might permit. But our 
shared efforts were nevertheless measured by the great Charles Alan 
Wright as a “malaise.”75 
Two packages of proposed amendments to the Civil Rules that I 
had a hand in drafting for the Advisory Committee went up the chain 
of command to the Standing Committee, one in 1990 and another in 
1992. Most, but not all, of our 1990 proposals became law in 1991, and 
most of our 1992 proposals became law in 1993.76 As the second 
package reached the Judicial Conference, Judge Pointer and I 
concluded that it was time to bring my service as Reporter to an end. 
My departure coincided with a reform in the Advisory 
Committee’s operations to provide additional support for the 
Reporter. Perhaps this reform was a result of the Administrative 
Office concluding that the job had become more complex and 
demanding than it had been during the first four decades following 
the promulgation of the Civil Rules in 1938.77 Professor Edward 
Cooper has done admirable work as my successor and has also had 
the very able assistance of Professor Richard Marcus. But it seems 
fair to say that even Professors Cooper and Marcus have not entirely 
calmed the waters roiled by the partisan disputes in which I became 
involved. 
 
uscourts/RulesandPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV04-1986-min.pdf. See generally Steven B. Burbank, 
Proposals to Amend Rule 68—Time to Abandon Ship, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 425 (1986) 
(discussing the Advisory Committee’s view on the ineffectiveness of Rule 68). 
 75. See generally Charles Alan Wright, Foreword: The Malaise of Federal Rulemaking, 14 
REV. LITIG. 1 (1994) (providing a survey of several federal rulemaking amendments). 
 76. Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 134 F.R.D. 525 (1991); Amendments 
to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401 (1993). 
 77. Indeed, there was a brief time in 1956–58 when there was no Advisory Committee and 
hence no Reporter. See Act of July 11, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-513, 72 Stat. 356 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2006)); see also Symposium, The Rule-Making Function and the 
Judicial Conference of the United States, 21 F.R.D. 117 (1957) (discussing that legislation). 
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III.  SUBSTANTIAL POLITICAL ISSUES CONFRONTED  
IN RULEMAKING: 1985–1992 
A. Issue 1: Congress and the Rules Enabling Act 
1. Proposals for Reform.  One of the items percolating at the 
time of my arrival as Reporter in 1985 was the Advisory Committee’s 
concern over pending proposals to amend the Rules Enabling Act 
itself. The proponent of the amendments was Congressman Robert 
Kastenmeier, who was the only member of Congress in my time as 
Reporter to take a serious interest in issues of judicial administration. 
He represented the second district of Wisconsin for sixteen terms, 
only to be defeated in 1990.78 I hope that it was not his willingness to 
invest time and effort in the study and reform of judicial 
administration that led to his defeat.79 He impressed me as one who 
had a clear sense of what he was doing and a commitment to the 
public good.80 
Congressman Kastenmeier’s 1985 proposed amendments to the 
Rules Enabling Act were a response, at least in part, to the 
scholarship of Professor Stephen Burbank, who had been temperately 
critical of the 1934 establishment of a rulemaking process that lacked 
full transparency and sensitivity to potential substantive 
consequences.81 If there was a partisan connection between this 
proposed reform of the Act and the larger political contest between 
the Great Society advocates and the advocates of the deregulation of 
business, I was not aware of the connection. 
 
 78. Kastenmeier, Robert William, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE U.S. CONGRESS, 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=K000020 (last visited Oct. 25, 2010). 
 79. See generally Larry Kramer, “The One-Eyed Are Kings”: Improving Congress’s Ability 
to Regulate the Use of Judicial Resources, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 73 (Summer 1991) 
(describing the problems with congressional engagement in issues of judicial administration). 
But see Avern Cohn, A Judge’s View of Congressional Action Affecting the Courts, 54 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, 99 (Summer 1991) (questioning whether the creation of a new agency in 
Congress will best improve congressional knowledge of events in the federal court system). 
 80. The federal courthouse in Madison bears his name, as does a lecture series at the 
University of Wisconsin Law School. “In 1985, Kastenmeier received the Warren E. Burger 
Award, presented by the institute for Court Management, and the Service Award of the 
National Center for State Courts. In 1988, he was honored by the American Judicature Society 
with its Justice Award for his contributions to improving the administration of justice.” The 
Robert W. Kastenmeier Lecture, U. OF WIS. L. SCH., http://www.law.wisc.edu/alumni/
kastenmeier.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2010). 
 81. See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 
1015 (1982) (arguing that lawmaking requires substantive transparency in addition to 
procedural safeguards). 
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2. Politicization and Transsubstantivity.  The two provisions of 
the Kastenmeier proposal were intended to elevate the sensitivity of 
the rulemaking process to political preferences and consequences. 
The first idea was to open our proceedings to observers and 
lobbyists.82 Judge Johnson and others were not happy with that 
proposal, fearing that it would introduce interest-group politics into 
the rulemaking process. There had been from the beginning a 
practice of publishing proposed rules for public comment. But some 
perceived that the 1934 vision of procedural rulemaking, as expressed 
in the structure of the first Advisory Committee and in the abstract, 
transsubstantive promise of Rule 1, aimed to avoid interest-group 
politics and concentrate on effective enforcement of the law. Those 
who opposed the change feared that lobbyists in our committee 
meetings might deprive the rulemaking process of its disinterest, and 
thus of its integrity and entitlement to public acceptance. 
An example of disinterested rulemaking was the celebrated 1966 
enlargement of the class action, which was approved by a unanimous 
Advisory Committee.83 Could such reforms, motivated by an innocent 
desire of rulemakers to serve the public good with more effective law 
enforcement, be achieved if interest groups were invited to 
participate in their deliberations? The Advisory Committee also 
recalled that special interest amendments had wrecked the admirably 
succinct New York Code of 1848 advanced by David Dudley Field84 in 
the decades following its enactment. These changes were ultimately 
embodied in the lengthy and uncelebrated Throop Code, assembled 
in the 1880s to record what the state legislature had done to Field’s 
Code in response to lobbying by the self-interested.85 
 
 82. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 401, 102 Stat. 
4642, 4649 (1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2073(c) (2006)) (opening Judicial Conference 
committee meetings to the public in most circumstances). 
 83. This occurred in the conference room of Covington & Burling LLP in Washington, 
D.C., where the Advisory Committee was sitting as guests of committee member Dean 
Acheson. The class-action enlargement was not presented at the time as a major political 
reform. Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 386–87 (1967) (describing the 
formulation of revised Federal Rule 23). 
 84. On Field’s role, see CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE 
PLEADING 18–19 (1928). See generally DAUN VAN EE, DAVID DUDLEY FIELD AND THE 
RECONSTRUCTION OF THE LAW (1986) (describing the life and work of David Dudley Field). 
 85. THROOP’S ANNOTATED CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (Montgomery H. Throop ed., 1st 
ed. 1886). For further discussion, see MILLAR, supra note 20, at 55–56; Stephen N. Subrin, 
Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural 
Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2046 (1989). 
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The structure of the rulemaking process was designed to 
encourage the making of transsubstantive rules. This purpose 
reflected the thinking of the celebrated English theorist Jeremy 
Bentham, who encouraged the separation of substance from 
procedure to focus the courts’ attention more on effective law 
enforcement and less on the intricacies of procedures fashioned 
separately for each common law form of action.86 Perhaps relying 
principally on the advice of David Dudley Field, numerous states in 
the nineteenth century enacted laws embracing Bentham’s vision.87 
Those who designed and enacted the 1934 Rules Enabling Act did 
not suppose that a procedure equally suited to all kinds of cases could 
be devised, but if special rules for a substantive category of cases were 
needed, their creation would be a task for Congress. Meanwhile, until 
such a special need should appear, a politically unaccountable group 
should work to serve the broad aims expressed by Bentham and 
stated in Rule 1. Or so it was thought.88 
But after assessing the situation on the ground in 1985, it seemed 
to the Advisory Committee unlikely that continued resistance to open 
meetings would succeed. Procedural rules have substantive 
consequences, and the 1985 Advisory Committee felt that those 
 
 86. 2 JEREMY BENTHAM, Principles of Judicial Procedure, with the Outlines of a Procedure 
Code, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 5 (John Bowring ed., Edinburgh, William Tait 
1843) (“By procedure, is meant the course taken for the execution of the laws [to accomplish] 
the will declared, or supposed to be declared, . . . in each instance.”). 
 87. See generally DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, WHAT SHALL BE DONE WITH THE PRACTICE OF 
THE COURTS? (1847), reprinted in 1 SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS 
OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 226 (A.P. Sprague ed., New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1884) 
(considering whether a uniform code of pleading is practicable); MILLAR, supra note 20 
(examining civil procedure in American trial courts); Steven N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and 
the Field Code: A Historical Analysis of an Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 311 
(1988) (discussing the development of the Field Code). 
 88. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Securing the Normative Foundations of Litigation Reform, 86 
B.U. L. REV. 1155, 1170 (2006) (suggesting that today’s reformers are uncertain about 
transsubstantive rules); Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a 
Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 739–40 (1975) (examining the tension between 
individual issues and transsubstantive rules of procedure); Jay Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice: 
The Form of Complex Litigation and the Limits of Judicial Power, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 
1746–50 (1992) (noting that judges require discretion when applying transsubstantive rules, but 
that this threatens the nature of the rules). Skepticism has been expressed in recent times. Rex 
R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The Revolution of 1938 and Its Discontents, 61 OKLA. L. 
REV. 275, 284–86 (2008) (explaining that the goals of the drafters of the Rules Enabling Act of 
1934 were different from what reformers are trying to accomplish today). For a thoughtful 
history of the idea, see David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in 
Federal Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371 (2010). 
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affected by a change in the rules should be heard.89 These hearings 
required wide distribution of the Reporter’s preliminary drafts 
inviting public comment. A few interest groups did show up at 
meetings in my time, and they were sometimes helpful, but they were 
unable to muster material influence on an Advisory Committee 
controlled by independent judges serving during good behavior.90 
Unlike Congressional lobbyists, they had no ability to affect the 
careers of the life-tenured judges whom they lobbied. 
3. Lobbying for Supersession.  Before the advent of public 
meetings, Judge Johnson as chair directed me to enlist resistance to 
the second provision of Congressman Kastenmeier’s proposed 
revision of the Rules Enabling Act to which the Advisory Committee 
objected. This was the proposed repeal of the supersession clause91 
declaring that existing statutes in conflict with new rules are to “be of 
no further force or effect.” The House of Representatives approved 
the repeal,92 but the Advisory Committee believed that the clause 
served to constrain conflicting and confusing interpretations of the 
Civil Rules based on inferences drawn from previous substantive 
enactments of Congress.93 
I succeeded in enlisting the aid of the ABA Section on 
Litigation, the American College of Trial Lawyers, and the 
Association of the Bar of the City of New York. These groups 
induced the Senate Judiciary Committee to hold a hearing that I 
attended on May 28, 1989. Former Attorney General Ben Civiletti, 
then chair of the ABA Section, offered testimony in favor of 
supersession. Professors Edward Cooper, Mary Kay Kane, and 
Charles Alan Wright also submitted statements supporting 
supersession. Professors Judith Resnik, representing the ACLU, and 
Stephen Burbank submitted statements opposing supersession. The 
Advisory Committee’s support for supersession prevailed in the 
Senate, and the law as enacted in 1988 retained the supersession 
 
 89. It was possibly for this reason that Judge Johnson stepped down from the Advisory 
Committee’s chair, so that it was Judge Weis who presided over the Advisory Committee’s first 
public meetings. 
 90. For my contemporaneous account, see Paul D. Carrington, The New Order in Judicial 
Rulemaking, 75 JUDICATURE 161 (1991). 
 91. H.R. REP. NO. 99-422, at 22–23 (1985). 
 92. H.R. 3550, 99th Cong., 131 Cong. Rec. 35,190–92 (1985). 
 93. For elaboration on the uses of the clause, see Paul D. Carrington, “Substance” and 
“Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 281, 322–27. 
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clause.94 I note, however, that the problem with supersession abides: 
there is now a circuit split on the application of the clause to the 
divergence between Section 3731 of Title 18 and Rule 4(b) of the 
Rules of Appellate Procedure.95 Whether this recent conflict reflects 
the possibility that our victorious lobbying was misguided I leave to 
wiser heads better informed by twenty-five years of additional 
experience. 
The Advisory Committee thereafter devoted our attention to the 
text of the Civil Rules, to the rules’ interpretation or 
misinterpretation by courts, and to any available data from the 
Administrative Office that might suggest how best to achieve the 
Rule 1 aims of reducing needless cost, delay, and confusion. In that 
spirit, and perhaps in response to the public debate over supersession 
and transsubstantivity, the Advisory Committee amended Rule 1 to 
urge pursuit of those aims in the case-managerial practices that had 
begun to replace the traditional forms of litigation. 
B. Issue 2: Belated Amendment to Correct the Identification  
of a Defendant 
A modest example of our committee work was Rule 15(c), 
pertaining to the relation between pleading amendments and statutes 
of limitations. The need to revise this rule came to the Advisory 
Committee’s attention because of the 1986 decision of the Supreme 
Court in Schiavone v. Fortune.96 The plaintiffs had sued alleging that 
they were defamed in Fortune magazine. Belatedly, they learned that 
there was no such corporate entity as Fortune. They then served the 
summons and complaint on the corporate publisher, Time, Inc. The 
Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations had run, barring 
their claims.97 Given that Time had in fact been fully informed of the 
filing of the claim long before the limitation period had run, this 
seemed inconsistent with the purpose of Rule 15(c) allowing 
amendments to “relate back” for the purposes of the statute. It also 
seemed at odds with the aims expressed in Rule 1.98 
 
 94. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 401, 102 
Stat. 4642, 4648–49 (1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006)). 
 95. See Anthony Vitarelli, Comment, A Blueprint for Applying the Rules Enabling Act’s 
Supersession Clause, 117 YALE L.J. 1225, 1225 (2008). 
 96. Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21 (1986). 
 97. Id. at 27. 
 98. Note the similarity of the Schiavone case to the Court’s more recent holdings that some 
rules imposing time limits that it deems to be jurisdictional cannot be waived by a defendant—
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The Advisory Committee invested a lot of time in the task of 
revising Rule 15(c), partly as a result of my shortcomings in drafting a 
text that fully solved the problem. In the effort to clarify the rule, we 
were striving to achieve simplicity; to that end, we tried to adhere to 
the rule urged by Professor Rosenberg, which cautioned us to keep 
the text simple by removing a word to make room for any word we 
proposed to add. In due course we recommended an amendment that 
was promulgated in 1991. Alas, our amendment was not so clear that 
it resolved the recurring issues in later cases. Scores of reported 
decisions have since interpreted our rule. Some of them may have 
been wrong.99 Yet in 2010, the Court unanimously decided a case 
closely resembling the Fortune case in conformity with the 1991 
revision. It relied in part on the statement of legislative purpose set 
forth in the Advisory Committee Notes to explain the text.100 
Curiously, Justice Scalia wrote a very brief concurring opinion101 to 
express his disapproval of the reference to the explanatory committee 
note that had been presented and presumably considered by the 
Advisory Committee, the Standing Committee of the Judicial 
Conference, the Conference, the Supreme Court, and both Houses of 
Congress. 
Similar explanatory notations are commonly found attached to 
the recommendations of the American Law Institute or the 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Their purpose is the same as 
the formal Opinion of the Court—to advance the prospect of 
common understanding and deter idiosyncratic interpretations by 
judges who are expected to enforce law. 
A few weeks after Justice Scalia’s curious concurrence, he 
repeated his protest when the Court cited the Advisory Committee 
 
even one who is fully informed and in no way prejudiced by a plaintiff’s mistaken 
noncompliance. E.g., Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007). In Bowles, the Court enforced 
the limit on the time for filing an appeal from a denial of habeas corpus. The petitioner missed 
by one day but filed on the day that the defense and the trial court had agreed was the last day. 
Id. at 2366–67. I question whether any member of Congress who voted for the law would have 
approved that result. But see Scott Dodson, Mandatory Rules, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2008) 
(explaining the roles of jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional rules). I regard the issue as one ripe 
for consideration by the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules. 
 99. Cf. Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 469–73 (4th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (holding 
that the relation-back rule is not limited to a mistake about the proper party’s identity). 
 100. Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 130 S. Ct. 2485, 2494–95 (2010). 
 101. Id. at 2498–99 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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Notes to one of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.102 This time, 
Justice Thomas joined. 
These protests reveal that some of the Justices resist ideas 
embedded in the Rules Enabling Act as impediments to the exercise 
of discretion by the Justices in making procedural laws conforming to 
their superior judgment. Among recent authors, Professor Benjamin 
Spencer has best reminded us that the rule-amendment process is 
preferable to judge-made law because it is a more democratic, 
transparent, and accountable method of law reform,103 even if it may 
impede the lawmaking ambition of the Justices. 
C. Issue 3: Rule 48 and Trial by Jury 
The Supreme Court has on several occasions chosen to disregard 
the text of the Civil Rules, the advice of those engaged in the 
rulemaking process, and even the text of the Constitution to conform 
the Civil Rules to the preferences of a majority of the Justices.104 At 
the time of my arrival as Reporter, there was ferment over what the 
Supreme Court and the district judges had done to the right to a jury 
in a civil case as assured by the Seventh Amendment. The Advisory 
Committee was obliged at least to reconsider the text of Rule 49, 
which had become misleading in light of then-recent developments 
altering the size of the civil jury.105 
I was among the many who disapproved of the Supreme Court’s 
decision confirming the discretion of district judges to impanel juries 
of fewer than twelve.106 That decision validated local rules that were 
not consistent with the text of Rule 49. Those local rules were not 
connected to the politics of Rule 1 or to business interests’ resistance 
 
 102. Black v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2963, 2963–70 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 103. A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 454 (2008). The same 
point was also made in reporting the Twombly decision in The Supreme Court, 2006 Term—
Leading Cases: Civil Procedure: Pleading Standards, 121 HARV. L. REV. 305, 313 (2007). 
 104. A major influence in moving the Court to think in this way was Justice Brennan, who 
saw his office as one that would “shape a way of life for the American people.” DAVID E. 
MARION, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JUSTICE WILLIAM J. BRENNAN. JR., THE LAW AND 
POLITICS OF “LIBERTARIAN DIGNITY” 161–62 (1997). 
 105. ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE 122 (1937), available at http://www.uscourts.gov
/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV04-1937.pdf (“Rule 49. Jurors of Less than Twelve. 
– Majority Verdict. The parties may stipulate that the jury shall consist of any number less than 
twelve or that a verdict or a finding or a stated majority of the jurors shall be taken as the 
verdict of finding of the jury.”). 
 106. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 159–60 (1973). 
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to private enforcement of public law, but did reflect a different divide, 
of constitutional import, over the measure of discretion to be vested 
in federal judges. It seemed that the Judicial Conference generally 
favored judicial discretion. Others favored more explicit rules to 
guide judges and lawyers and assure that the law was evenhandedly 
enforced. 
In the early 1970s at a Fourth Circuit judicial conference, I heard 
Chief Justice Burger in an informal discussion with perhaps twenty 
lawyers propose that the civil jury be eliminated to allow district 
judges to decide cases more efficiently.107 The decision to allow judges 
to reduce the civil jury to six was, for the Chief Justice, a halfway 
measure, but it conformed to a recommendation of an ABA 
committee.108 The idea of a six-person jury had been presented to 
Congress in 1971, and again in 1973 and 1977, but Congress took no 
positive action.109 
Given its disregard for the tradition and text of the Seventh 
Amendment and the failure of the proposal to gain the acceptance of 
Congress, the decision also implied that district judges were 
practically free to exercise judicial power in the manner of English 
chancellors110 and to disregard the text of Rule 49 by allowing a jury of 
fewer than twelve by stipulation of the parties. That disregard of the 
text was a source of concern to the Advisory Committee. 
After perhaps improvidently expressing my own disapproval of 
the Court’s decision at a conference at the University of Chicago 
convened to discuss the topic,111 I put the issue of Rule 48 on the 
Advisory Committee’s agenda. It was clear that the committee in 
1990 would not reconsider the six-person jury, but it did agree to 
make the text of the rule correspond to reality. A few years later, 
after my time, the committee supported a return to the twelve-person 
jury, but it was unable to gain the support of the Judicial 
Conference.112 
 
 107. See Warren E. Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary—1971, 57 A.B.A. J. 855, 858 
(1971). 
 108. Report Number 1 of the Special Committee on Coordination of Judicial Improvements, 
99 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 182, 305 (1974). 
 109. For an account of the efforts, see Resnik, supra note 61, at 141–43. 
 110. See Subrin, supra note 25, at 918–20 (explaining the role of chancellors). 
 111. Paul D. Carrington, The Seventh Amendment: Some Bicentennial Reflections, 1990 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 33, 51. 
 112. Leading the effort was Richard S. Arnold. See Richard S. Arnold, Trial by Jury: The 
Constitutional Right to a Jury of Twelve in Civil Trials, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 27–35 (1993). 
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IV.  REFORMING THE DISCOVERY RULES:  
MANDATORY DISCLOSURE 
While we attended to such technical matters, the political pot of 
deregulation or tort reform to protect business from unwelcome 
private law enforcement continued to boil, and the Advisory 
Committee was feeling its heat. 
A. The Text of Rule 35 
Congress again joined in (or intruded into) our enterprise in 1988 
by quietly enacting as Section 7047 of its mammoth Anti-Drug Abuse 
Act a revision of Rule 35 authorizing mental examinations of parties 
by psychologists as well as psychiatrists.113 The Advisory Committee 
had no objection to this amendment and followed the lead of 
Congress, proposing in 1991 that Rule 35 be amended to enable 
parties to secure examinations by other “suitably” qualified 
professionals—the experts perhaps best suited to assess some 
personal injuries.114 Some regretted that Congress had not referred 
the issue to the Judicial Conference for its consideration. 
B. Localization 
In the same 1988 law, Congress also expressed concern over the 
localization of federal law by the promulgation of diverse local rules 
of procedure.115 Delocalization had been a raison d’etre of the 1938 
Rules. Localization was seen to be a significant problem because it 
introduced additional elements of complexity and uncertainty into the 
national law governing proceedings in the federal courts.116 Some 
districts’ elaborate local rules also threatened disharmony with the 
secondary aim of the 1934 Act—to enable counsel to represent clients 
 
 113. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7047, 102 Stat. 4181, 4401 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 4247 (2006); FED. R. CIV. P. 35). Section 7047 extended the 
role of psychologists in enforcing the drug laws; Congress also amended Rule 35 to 
accommodate the role of psychologists. 
 114. FED. R. CIV. P. 35 advisory committee’s note to 1991 amendment. 
 115. Id. For a current review of the problem of localization, see Samuel P. Jordan, Local 
Rules and the Limits of Trans-Territorial Procedure, 52 WM. &. MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 
Nov. 2010). 
 116. See Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REV. 51, 55–58 (1997); 
Lauren Robel, Fractured Procedure: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN L. REV. 
1447, 1449 (1994); Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and 1990 Judicial Improvements Acts, 46 
STAN. L. REV. 1589, 1589–92 (1994). 
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in diverse federal courts without the need to study local practices. 
Such unleashing of local rulemakers was seen as threatening chaos.117 
The most common kind of local rule invalidated by Congress was 
a restriction on the number of interrogatories a party could serve 
except by leave of court;118 almost every district had such a rule, and 
after 1988 all of them were invalid. The Advisory Committee that I 
served felt an obligation to respond both to the concern of Congress 
about localization119 and the concerns expressed by local advisory 
committees that were prone to constrain discovery practices. 
C. Discovery Costs 
The center of much political discourse then, as now, was the cost 
and effectiveness of the discovery rules. No one doubted that many 
lawyers were very thorough and sometimes abusive in conducting 
discovery. An unextraordinary example brought to my attention was 
an extended three-day deposition of a university president by a 
lawyer advancing a claim for medical malpractice against the 
university’s hospital. It seemed obvious by the second day of the 
deposition, if not long before, that the deponent had no relevant 
information, but the deposition continued. The apparent aim of the 
extended deposition was to induce the president to agree to a 
settlement in order to terminate his endless questioning. Such abuses 
were equally obvious to many observers of big commercial cases 
litigated by lawyers paid by the hour to conduct depositions in teams 
of three or more. 
D. The Task Force on Civil Justice: Justice for All 
In 1987, in response to the political ferment over such costs, the 
Brookings Institution appointed a Task Force on Civil Justice 
Reform. This appeared to be a response to a proposal by Senator 
Joseph Biden, who was at the time the chair of the Judiciary 
Committee. He may even have suggested some or all of the thirty-five 
members of the study group. They met several times at Brookings to 
 
 117. See Carrington, supra note 32, at 938–39. Localism abides, and some local rules are 
nontranssubstantive. Marcus, supra note 88, at 427–29. 
 118. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE ON THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF 
THE U.S., REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT 95–99 (1988). 
 119. E.g., Robert E. Keeton, The Function of Local Rules and the Tension with Uniformity, 
50 U. PITT. L. REV. 853, 860–62 (1989). 
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debate the issues, received the results of a Lou Harris poll,120 and in 
1989 published a report entitled Justice for All: Reducing Costs and 
Delay in Civil Litigation.121 This title suggested fidelity to the aims of 
the 1938 Civil Rules and the antecedent politics favoring effective 
private law enforcement. It favored ideas then circulating among the 
federal judiciary: differential case management, earlier judicial 
engagement, encouragement of voluntary exchange of information, 
early resolution of discovery disputes before the filing of motions, and 
referral of appropriate cases to alternative dispute resolution 
programs. Justice for All also advocated empirical studies by an 
independent source in addition to those provided by the Federal 
Judicial Center.122 
There was at the time of this publication a manifest shortage of 
data to resolve conflicting observations bearing on the feasibility of its 
proposals. Yet Justice for All provided the basis for Senator Biden’s 
proposed legislation, enacted as the Civil Justice Reform Act of 
1990.123 The Business Round Table124 and the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants supported the Act,125 but some federal 
judges regarded such action by the Senate as an affront to judicial 
independence and opposed the measure. In their view, procedural 
rules were solely the business of the Judicial Conference.126 The 
Senate Committee Report, in the tradition of the 1938 Civil Rules, 
explained that the Act was “to promote for all citizens—rich or poor, 
 
 120. LOUIS HARRIS & ASSOCS., PROCEDURAL REFORM OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A 
STUDY CONDUCTED FOR THE FOUNDATION FOR CHANGE, INC. (1989) (stating that many 
federal judges, corporate counsel, and public interest litigators agreed that transaction costs are 
problematic and can result in unequal justice). 
 121. BROOKINGS INST., JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS AND DELAY IN CIVIL 
LITIGATION (1989). Charles Alan Wright generously describes the report as “particularly 
influential.” WRIGHT, supra note 26, at 436. Its influence was, however, preordained; causation 
went from the Senate to Brookings, not from Brookings to the Senate. 
 122. Cf. Laurens Walker, Perfecting Federal Civil Rules: A Proposal for Restricted Field 
Experiments, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 67–68 (Summer 1988) (explaining the need for 
empirical studies and suggesting a methodology). 
 123. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. I, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471–482 (2006)). 
 124. Press Release, PR Newswire, Importance of Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 Stressed 
by the Business Roundtable (Jan. 23, 1990) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). See generally 
Jeffrey J. Peck, “Users United”: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 105, 107 (Summer 1991) (discussing the Civil Justice Reform Act’s substantive changes 
and the process leading to the creation of the Act). 
 125. AICPA endorses Civil Justice Reform Act, J. ACCOUNTANCY, Apr. 1990, at 27, 27. 
 126. See Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77 MINN. L. 
REV. 375, 407–35 (1992); Robel, supra note 116, at 1450. 
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individual or corporation, plaintiff or defendant—the just, speedy and 
inexpensive resolution of civil disputes in our Nation’s federal 
courts.”127 It empowered district courts to experiment with diverse 
forms of case management in response to the not-very-original ideas 
set forth in Justice for All.128 The experimenting district courts were 
required to appoint and consult local advisory committees of suitable 
diversity.129 The statute called for an independent study of the results 
over a seven-year period.130 
E. The Idea of Mandatory Disclosure 
In 1989, at the direction of the Advisory Committee, I drafted for 
its consideration a possible amendment to Rule 26 requiring parties 
to make voluntary disclosures of relevant and discoverable 
information. My draft was a radical proposal requiring disclosure of 
just about everything an advocate might have that the other side 
might want to know about a newly filed case. The basic idea of 
mutual disclosure had been suggested by then-Magistrate Wayne 
Brazil in 1978, and our draft adopted his idea.131 
Consistent with traditional practice, as well as with Congressman 
Kastenmeier’s policy of transparency in rulemaking, we circulated 
this preliminary draft to seek comment from diverse interested 
 
 127. S. REP. NO. 101-416, at 1 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6804. 
 128. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, § 102, 104 Stat. at 5089–90 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 471 note). 
 129. The act ordered each experimenting U.S. district court to implement a Civil Justice 
Expense and Delay Reduction Plan under the direction of an advisory group comprising “those 
who must live with the civil justice system on a regular basis.” S. REP. NO. 101-416, at 414, 
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6817 (quoting 136 CONG. REC. 589 (1990) (statement of Sen. 
Biden, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary)). 
 130. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, § 103, 104 Stat. at 5096 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 471 
note) (“The requirements set forth in sections 471 through 478 . . . shall remain in effect for 
seven years after the date of the enactment of this title.”). There were criticisms of the Act. See, 
e.g., A. Leo Levin, Beyond Techniques of Case Management: The Challenge of the Civil Justice 
Reform Act of 1990, 67 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 877, 894 (1993) (“[I]t must be clear that this is hardly 
the way to maintain uniformity in a national system of courts.”). Among the problems presented 
was a difficulty in measuring its expiration. See Carl Tobias, The Expiration of the Civil Justice 
Reform Act, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 541, 542–43 (2002) (noting that there were differing 
interpretations of the Act’s expiration). 
 131. Brazil, Adversary Character, supra note 57, at 1348–57 (1978) (arguing that the duty to 
voluntarily disclose information should not be limited to formal investigations, “but [should] 
extend[] to all material data, regardless of how it is acquired”); see also William W Schwarzer, 
The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 703, 721 
(1989) (suggesting that discovery rules be altered to require “prompt disclosure of all material 
documents”). 
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scholars, judges, and lawyers. It was obvious to the Advisory 
Committee when it met to consider my draft and the comments 
received that our proposal needed work. Among its worrisome 
features was a requirement that all expert reports be disclosed. The 
Advisory Committee sensed that this went too far; such material 
might be discoverable in due course, but the parties could not 
properly be required to commit themselves to a line of expert 
testimony before the issues of fact, if any, were clearly defined. Yet 
for want of a better idea, some of the experimental districts 
promulgated our draft as a local rule to be tested empirically. 
The Advisory Committee sought to contain such rampant 
localization of discovery practice. So, after further consideration, we 
circulated a draft of the rule that would authorize local districts to 
enact disclosure rules more prudently limited than the rule I had 
improvidently circulated earlier. The Advisory Committee proposed 
adding two full pages of text to Rule 26(a) prescribing what the 
Advisory Committee deemed an appropriate duty of disclosure and 
its limits; we stopped short in that draft of requiring counsel to 
anticipate the allegations of the adversary. On receipt of this draft, 
some districts promulgated it as their local rule, and some drew 
criticism for doing so.132 But as a result, there were three and possibly 
more versions of Rule 26 in different local districts. 
F. The Council on Competitiveness 
Meanwhile, as the local district advisory committees were doing 
their work pursuant to the Civil Justice Reform Act, the political 
premises of that law were being contested by a Republican 
administration seeking reelection in 1992. The Republicans 
positioned themselves as faithful to business interests beleaguered not 
only by the high cost of litigation, but also by substantive concerns 
over the application of tort law to deter disapproved business 
practices. Vice President Dan Quayle was appointed to lead a 
Council on Competitiveness staffed largely—if not entirely—by loyal 
Republicans committed to protecting the ability of American business 
 
 132. See Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the 
Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 813–21 (1991) (describing the observations of 
attorneys in Florida following the adoption of the rule in their district). 
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to compete profitably in global markets.133 Deregulation was their 
often-stated aim. 
In the same vein, and contemporaneous with the appointment of 
the Council on Competitiveness, scholar and Circuit Judge Frank 
Easterbrook protested that American business interests were being 
threatened because trial judges were helpless to control parties 
abusing the discovery process. Judge Easterbrook viewed the case-
management powers conferred on district judges as inadequate to the 
task.134 This assessment was no more rooted in data than was Justice 
for All, but Judge Easterbrook expressed no need for information 
about the facts on the ground. 
The Quayle Council on Competitiveness conducted hearings, 
and in 1990 I was summoned to a Council hearing in the Department 
of Justice to explain the ongoing consideration of the discovery rules 
and the reasons, if any, for not repealing Rules 26 through 37. It is fair 
to say that my words were without effect. In 1991, the Council 
published its Agenda for Civil Justice Reform,135 recommending many 
changes in the civil justice system, including reversing the 
longstanding American Rule136 and introducing the principle that the 
 
 133. See DAVID S. BRODER & BOB WOODWARD, THE MAN WHO WOULD BE PRESIDENT: 
DAN QUAYLE 125–28 (1992) (“[Quayle] made his chairmanship . . . a command post for a war 
against government regulation of American business.”); Warren T. Brookes, The President’s 
Council on Competitiveness, NATION’S BUS., May 1989, at 32, 32 (noting that Vice President 
Quayle was the perfect candidate to run “this potentially pathfinding effort”). The House of 
Representatives denied funding to the Council. Kenneth J. Cooper, Divided House Bars Funds 
for Quayle Competitiveness Council, WASH. POST, July 2, 1992, at A6; see also Jonathan H. 
Adler, Quayle’s Hush-Hushed Council, NAT’L REV., Nov. 2, 1992, at 28, 28 (“Democrats called 
the vote an act of good government while Republicans denounced it as campaign-year 
politics.”). 
 134. Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 638–39 (1989) 
(emphasizing that judges have little control over the discovery process because the parties 
“control the legal claims to be presented and conduct the discovery themselves”). Contrast the 
speculative view of Judge William Schwarzer, see Schwarzer, supra note 131, at 707, and the 
contrary opinion expressed by Judge Richard Posner in American Nurses Ass’n v. Illinois, 783 
F.2d 716, 723–27 (7th Cir. 1986) (observing that the Council’s main goal was to reduce 
regulation). 
 135. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM 
IN AMERICA (1991). 
 136. The American Rule was expressed in Act of Feb. 26, 1853 (Fees Act), ch. 80, §§ 1, 3, 10 
Stat. 161, 161–69. The Act expressed the holding of the Court in Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 
Dall.) 306 (1796), that counsel’s fees were not properly included in damages. Id. at 306; see also 
John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 9 (Winter 1984) (explaining that the recoverable amount of attorney fees 
is determined by the legislature); John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: 
The Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1571 (1993) (noting that the 
CARRINGTON IN FINAL.DOC 11/29/2010  6:56:44 PM 
2010] POLITICS AND CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES 629 
loser must pay the full costs of the winner of a lawsuit. The Council 
did not advance my suggestion to reduce discovery costs by 
forbidding hourly billing by lawyers engaged in discovery to eliminate 
the incentive for wasteful practices. 
Vice President Quayle was an outspoken champion of the 
Council’s Agenda,137 and though he was not alone in voicing that 
view,138 his explanatory remarks to a meeting of the ABA were not 
well received.139 Indeed, in a blistering denunciation, Talbot 
D’Alemberte, the President of the ABA, accused Vice President 
Quayle of using discredited statistics to advance ill-founded views.140 
As Judge Learned Hand had observed long before, rhetoric 
 
American Rule “reflects simple adherence to legislative commands”); see also William W 
Schwarzer, Fee-Shifting Offers of Judgment—An Approach to Reducing the Cost of Litigation, 
76 JUDICATURE 147, 148 (1992) (arguing that a loser-pays rule in the U.S. would deter some 
litigation because of the risk of having to pay the winner’s fees if unsuccessful). 
 137. See Dan Quayle, Too Much Litigation: True Last Year, True Now, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 10, 
1992, at 17 (“Our recommendations . . . will result in swifter, and less costly, justice.”); Dan 
Quayle, Vice President of the U.S., Remarks to the American Business Conference, in FED. 
NEWS SERV., Oct. 1, 1991 (“Despite the obvious—that there are social and economic costs when 
litigation is overused or abused—some lawyers with an interest in preserving the status quo 
have maintained that there really are no problems in our legal system.”). 
 138. See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS 
CONSEQUENCES 4 (1988) (suggesting that the increase in tort litigation “costs American 
individuals, businesses, municipalities, and other government bodies at least $80 billion a year” 
in the form of a tort tax); Jack Anderson, U.S. Has Become Nation of Lawsuits, WASH. POST, 
Jan. 25, 1985, at B8 (“No case is too distant, no client too remote to daunt America’s tenacious 
lawyers—if the fee is right.”); George [H.W.] Bush, President of the U.S., Remarks at a Labor 
Day Picnic, in FED. NEWS SERV., Sept. 7, 1992 (advocating for reform in the civil justice system 
to decrease the amount America spends on lawsuits); Robert F. Dee, Blood Bath, ENTERPRISE, 
Mar.–Apr. 1986, at 3 (“Like a plague of locusts, U.S. lawyers with their clients have descended 
on America and are suing the country out of business. Literally.”). 
 139. David Margolick, Address by Quayle on Justice Proposals Irks Bar Association, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 14, 1991, at A1. For his account of his presentation, see DAN QUAYLE, STANDING 
FIRM: A VICE-PRESIDENTIAL MEMOIR 282–90 (1994). 
 140. Randall Samborn & Rorie Sherman, Quayle Spices Up ABA Meeting, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 
17, 1992, at 1. Among the studies that the vice president appeared not to have consulted were 
PAUL R. CONNOLLY, EDITH A. HOLLEMAN & MICHAEL J. KUHLMAN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY (1978), and 
EBERSOLE & BURKE, supra note 57. Related research, which the vice president may not have 
consulted, includes PROJECT FOR EFFECTIVE JUSTICE, FIELD SURVEY OF FEDERAL PRETRIAL 
DISCOVERY: REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1965); 
MAURICE ROSENBERG, THE PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND EFFECTIVE JUSTICE: A 
CONTROLLED TEST IN PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATION (1964); DANIEL SEGAL, FED. JUDICIAL 
CTR., SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE ON DISCOVERY FROM 1970 TO THE PRESENT: EXPRESSED 
DISSATISFACTIONS AND PROPOSED REFORMS (1978); Maurice Rosenberg, Professor of Law, 
Colum. L. Sch., Changes Ahead in Federal Pretrial Discovery, (Mar. 23, 1968), in 45 F.R.D. 479 
(1969). 
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forecasting doom, such as the Vice President’s, has been heard since 
the time of Hammurabi.141 Professor Marc Galanter soon offered 
empirical evidence that the “litigation explosion” to which the 
Council on Competitiveness purported to respond did not exist;142 
there was no contrary study produced to question his conclusion. 
In due course, the Council on Competitiveness made some 
recommendations that resembled those advanced by the Brookings 
group.143 One notable recommendation that may have deserved more 
attention than it received aimed to constrain overuse of expert 
testimony.144 Professor Deborah R. Hensler assessed the council’s 
broader proposals as going well beyond procedural reform; “[they] 
seek to change the current balance between individual plaintiffs and 
corporate defendants, in favor of the latter. That agenda,” she 
observed, “is a political one, and it ought be debated and decided on 
the floors of Congress and state legislatures.”145 No one contended 
otherwise, but few debates, if any, were held. 
G. Empirical Evaluation of Mandatory Disclosure 
While the Council on Competitiveness was having its day,146 the 
Advisory Committee was receiving early reports of the ongoing 
 
 141. See supra note 52. 
 142. Marc Galanter, News from Nowhere: The Debased Debate on Civil Justice, 71 DENV. U. 
L. REV. 77, 83–90 (1993). 
 143. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 135 (recommending fifty 
specific reforms designed to improve efficiency in litigation). Its recommendations were 
embodied in the Access to Justice Act, S. 2180, 102d Cong. (1992); see also Exec. Order No. 
12,778, 3 C.F.R. 359 (1992). See generally Dan Quayle, Civil Justice Reform, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 
559 (1992) (highlighting proposals for civil justice reform). For an account of the recent 
developments in civil justice reform, see Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform Roadmap, 142 F.R.D. 
507, 509–11 (1992); Carl Tobias, Executive Branch Civil Justice Reform, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1521, 
1552–58 (1993). 
 144. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 135, at 21–22 (suggesting a 
reform of the rules controlling expert witnesses). 
 145. Deborah R. Hensler, Taking Aim at the American Legal System: The Council on 
Competitiveness’s Agenda for Legal Reform, 75 JUDICATURE 244, 250 (1992); see also Carl 
Tobias, Silver Linings in Federal Civil Justice Reform, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 857, 858–60 (1993) 
(acknowledging the benefits of the Civil Justice Reform Program); Weinstein, supra note 54, at 
833–34 (arguing that procedural civil justice reforms are having a substantive effect without 
being framed as substantive reforms). 
 146. A nongovernmental organization of “CEOs, university presidents and labor leaders” 
took the same name in 2002. About Us—Compete.org, COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, http://
www.compete.org/about-us (last visited Sept. 27, 2010). For a scorching assessment of the 
Quayle Council’s handiwork, see Undoing Quayle Council Damage, OMB WATCH (July 3, 
2002), http://www.ombwatch.org/node/740. 
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empirical studies envisioned by the Brookings group and conducted 
by RAND147 and the Federal Judicial Center.148 The early data 
indicated that the disclosure requirements established in some district 
courts were achieving modest savings in the cost of litigation. 
Although the seven-year period of experimentation specified by the 
1990 Act had five years yet to run, the Advisory Committee decided 
in 1992 to recommend the promulgation of our improved draft of 
Rule 26, lending support to the local rules requiring limited 
disclosures to adversaries before any requests. 
H. Other Limitations: Rules 16, 30, and 33 
While it was reconsidering Rule 26, the Advisory Committee 
also agreed to limit the number and length of depositions149 and the 
number of written interrogatories150 that a party might impose on an 
adversary without leave of court. The Advisory Committee proposed 
revisions of Rules 30 and 33 for those purposes; we also proposed 
revisions of other discovery rules151 to fit them to the 1992 package. 
And we proposed to amend Rule 16 to permit and encourage greater 
use of pretrial meetings to plan discovery and trial. The Advisory 
Committee modestly expected these amendments to serve the stated 
aims of both the competing Quayle and Biden groups, and empirical 
evidence suggests that at least some did.152 
These modest reforms were not expected to resolve all the 
disarray, but at least some of us thought that they might help to calm 
the storm of the Council on Competitiveness. We also thought they 
would ease the concern about the proliferation of localization 
threatening the national uniformity that had been the first object of 
the 1934 law and the reason that many states had signed on to the 
 
 147. James S. Kakalik, Terence Dunworth, Laural A. Hill, Daniel McCaffrey, Marian 
Oshiro, Nicholas M. Pace & Mary E. Vaiana, Just, Speedy and Inexpensive? An Evaluation of 
Judicial Case Management Under the Civil Justice Reform Act, 49 ALA. L. REV. 17, 17–19 (1997). 
For a study of this report, see Bryant G. Garth, Observations on an Uncomfortable Relationship: 
Civil Procedure and Empirical Research, 49 ALA. L. REV. 103 (1997). 
 148. DONNA STIENSTRA, MOLLY JOHNSON & PATRICIA LOMBARD, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON COURT ADMINISTRATION AND CASE 
MANAGEMENT: A STUDY OF THE FIVE DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS ESTABLISHED UNDER 
THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990, at 1 (1997). 
 149. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2); id. 30(d)(1). 
 150. Id. 33(a)(1). 
 151. Id. 37. 
 152. Kakalik et al., supra note 147, at 45–46. 
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Civil Rules in haec verba.153 The Standing Committee approved our 
efforts. The Judicial Conference approved. And the Supreme Court 
promulgated our proposed amendments.154 
I. My Personal Immortality 
But that was not quite the end of the story on mandatory 
disclosures in my time as Reporter. Several months after the Court 
promulgated our proposed rule, the leadership of the ABA suddenly 
became incensed at the idea of mandatory disclosure,155 and President 
Bush expressed his disapproval.156 So did Justice Scalia.157 The very 
idea was said to be an offense against the sacred adversary tradition. 
To make any voluntary disclosure to an adversary was seen as a 
betrayal of the client. The House Judiciary Committee unanimously 
recommended that Congress veto the amendment to Rule 26.158 And 
the House of Representatives did just that; it overwhelmingly 
disapproved of our rule as promulgated by the Court and rejected it 
in a voice vote.159 
But under the Rules Enabling Act, the veto required majority 
votes of disapproval in both houses. The proposed reform therefore 
went to the Senate, where the ABA lobbyists had clearly doomed it. 
But the Senate Judiciary Committee had to disapprove of the rule 
before sending it to the full Senate—at a time when the committee 
was on a calendar requiring short meetings with limited debate and 
 
 153. See generally Oakley & Coon, supra note 35 (classifying certain states as replicators of 
the federal rules). 
 154. Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401 (1993). 
 155. See Charles W. Sorenson, Jr., Disclosure Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)—
“Much Ado About Nothing?,” 46 HASTINGS L.J. 679, 729 (1995) (suggesting that the profession 
“unleash[ed] a flood of criticism on the disclosure proposal”). There were over three hundred 
written submissions received from individual practitioners, law firms, scholars, bar associations, 
plaintiffs’ and defense trial lawyer associations, insurers, public interest groups, federal district 
judges, and industry. Of them, all but approximately a dozen opposed the new rule. Griffin B. 
Bell, Chilton Davis Varner & Hugh Q. Gottschalk, Automatic Disclosure in Discovery—The 
Rush to Reform, 27 GA. L. REV. 1, 28 (1992). 
 156. Exec. Order No. 12,778, 3 C.F.R. 359 (1992). 
 157. Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 507, 510–12 (1983) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 158. Alfred W. Cortese Jr. & Kathleen L. Blaner, A Change in the Rules Draws Fire: 
Litigators Fight to Stop Mandatory Disclosure, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 18, 1993, at 25; see also 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2074(a) (2006) (establishing the process for submitting rules to Congress). 
 159. 139 CONG. REC. 27,271–74 (1993); see also Paul D. Carrington, Learning from the Rule 
26 Brouhaha: Our Courts Need Real Friends, 156 F.R.D. 295, 309 (1994). Though the totals from 
the voice vote are not recorded, I recall this vote as being unanimous against the rule. 
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unanimity to send a proposal to the full Senate. The Subcommittee on 
Courts and Administrative Practice conducted a brief hearing, at 
which Judge Pointer was allowed five minutes.160 Unanimity was 
denied when Senator Howard Metzenbaum of Ohio raised his hand 
to insist on a full hearing in the Judiciary Committee on the issues 
presented.161 But there could be no hearing within the time allowed by 
the Rules Enabling Act for the congressional veto. So the rule I had 
the pleasure of drafting became the law of the United States 
notwithstanding its overwhelming disapproval by the House of 
Representatives and its almost certain disapproval by the Senate. I do 
not expect that anyone will ever equal my achievement in writing a 
law that a unanimous (as I recall the voice vote) house of Congress 
could not prevent from becoming the law of the United States. And 
“my” rule abides.162 Perhaps the event demonstrates the frailties of 
democratic civil rulemaking. 
J. The Continuing Dispute over Disclosure Requirements 
Indeed, it may now be concluded that the adversary tradition 
has, for the moment, survived and that the disclosures required by 
Rule 26 may have reduced costs in some cases. But the disclosures 
have been no magic bullet163 and have drawn some criticism of their 
 
 160. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 2–5 
(1993). This hearing occurred prior to the House vote. 
 161. Shilpa Shah, Note, An Application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1) to 
Section 1983 Actions: Does Rule 26(a)(1) Violate the Rules Enabling Act?, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
115, 120 (1995) (citing Randall Samborn, New Discovery Rules Take Effect, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 6, 
1993, at 3). 
 162. Several authors offered contemporaneous comment. See Virginia E. Hench, Mandatory 
Disclosure and Equal Access to Justice: The 1993 Federal Discovery Rules Amendments and the 
Just, Speedy and Inexpensive Determination of Every Action, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 179, 207 (1994) 
(suggesting that a different approach to pretrial procedure is needed “to avoid endless rounds of 
‘satellite proceedings,’ and the constant potential for attorney-client conflict” (footnote 
omitted)); Robert E. Oliphant, Four Years of Experience with Rule 26(a)(1): The Rule is Alive 
and Well, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 323, 341–44 (1998) (reviewing the implementation of Rule 
26(a)(1)); Bedora A. Sheronick, Note, Rock, Scissors, Paper: The Federal Rule 26(a)(1) 
“Gamble” in Iowa, 80 IOWA L. REV. 363, 366 (1995) (arguing that the amended Rule 26 may be 
one of modern civil procedure’s “most significant innovations” (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 
U.S. 495, 500 (1947))). See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive 
Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. 
L. REV. 1393 (1994). 
 163. TERENCE DUNWORTH & JAMES S. KAKALIK, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, 
EVALUATING THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990 (1995), http://www.rand.org/pubs/
research_briefs/RB9022 (“Overall, implicit policy changes may be as important as explicit ones. 
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own.164 And the movement led in 1992 by Vice President Quayle for 
deregulation or tort reform abides in the expressions of politicians 
and other leaders who share a lack of interest in real data of the sort 
assembled by RAND or the Federal Judicial Center.165 So, agitation 
for reform of the discovery rules continues.166 Reforms of discovery 
imposed since the enactment of the Civil Justice Reform Act have 
done little to abate that political movement that wishes to reduce the 
legal expenses of businesses and the effectiveness of private 
enforcement of laws that they would prefer not to obey. With their 
objective in mind, I have elsewhere suggested that the fee-shifting 
scheme advocated by the Quayle Commission be adopted but applied 
only to discovery motions, in which context it might serve to deter 
needless squabbling over the limits of the right to conduct private 
investigations of claims and defenses.167 That proposal has not been 
 
Many judges and lawyers have commented in interviews that the process of implementing the 
pilot plans has raised the consciousness of judicial officers, clerks, and lawyers, with resulting 
subtle changes in how things are done—perhaps fewer continuances, more attention to the cost 
of discovery, more effort to settle cases.”); JAMES S. KAKALIK, TERENCE DUNWORTH, LAURAL 
A. HILL, DANIEL MCCAFFREY, MARIAN OSHIRO, NICHOLAS M. PACE & MARY E. VAIANA, 
RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER 
THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 61–65 (1996); WILLIAM W SCHWARZER, LYNN H. PASAHOW 
& JAMES B. LEWIS, CIVIL DISCOVERY AND MANDATORY DISCLOSURE: A GUIDE TO 
EFFICIENT PRACTICE 6 (2d ed. 1994) (“The objections to [the disclosure] amendments 
expressed before they went into effect appear to have proved unfounded by the experience 
under them . . . .”); Edward D. Cavanagh, The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990: Requiescat in 
Pace, 173 F.R.D. 565, 569 (1997) (“All in all, the CJRA was an unfortunate rush to judgment on 
the problems afflicting the federal judicial system and how to solve them.”); Steven Flanders, 
The Unanswered Question: Research on the Effects of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 Tells 
Little About How to Mitigate Excessive Cost or Delay, 82 JUDICATURE 55 (1998); Elizabeth 
Plapinger, Rand Study of Civil Justice Reform Act Sparks Debate, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 24, 1997, at 
B18 (“Most controversial . . . are the report’s findings or lack of findings on ADR’s impact on 
cost and delay.”). 
 164. Bell et al., supra note 155, at 2 (“The criticism of the civil justice system has reached a 
crescendo in recent years.”); Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Reforming the New 
Discovery Rules, 84 GEO. L.J. 61, 82–88 (1995) (arguing that the mandatory disclosure rule is 
unlikely to have an effect on discovery costs). 
 165. For an apt account, see Miller, supra note 43. 
 166. Paul V. Niemeyer, Here We Go Again: Are the Federal Discovery Rules Really in Need 
of Amendment?, 39 B.C. L. REV. 517, 520–21 (1998) (explaining the reexamination of the 
discovery rules to determine whether full disclosure is too expensive and if any changes could be 
made to make the system more efficient); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Ulysses Tied to the Generic 
Whipping Post: The Continuing Odyssey of Discovery “Reform,” 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
197, 225–28 (Spring–Summer 2001) (“Additional study, experimentation, and reflection can be 
tolerated by the court system and may prove beneficial in the long run.”). 
 167. See Carrington, supra note 116, at 66 (suggesting the use of fee shifting when parties 
engage in discovery litigation). 
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adopted—nor even, so far as I can tell, advanced by any business 
interests. 
V.  RULE 4 AND SERVICE OF PROCESS ABROAD 
A. Formalities of Service 
Congress tinkered with Rule 4 in 1983,168 facilitating service of 
summons by eliminating the traditional need to employ a U.S. 
Marshal and by adopting a provision shifting the costs of service to a 
defendant who refused to waive the needless and costly formality of 
personal service. State courts had previously adopted both schemes, 
and they seemed to be useful methods of reducing legal costs.169 The 
Act was a reminder that Congress is and should be ultimately in 
charge of making our national law. 
But in that enactment, Congress seemingly neglected to provide 
that the device of requested waiver of formal service of process could 
be employed when the defendant to be served was outside the state in 
which the court was sitting.170 The Advisory Committee perceived a 
need to correct that apparent oversight and also to amend Rule 4 to 
reduce a hazard imposed on parties suing the United States or its 
officers. That hazard arose when a court of appeals held that a party 
serving a summons on fewer than all of many necessary parties to 
such an action within the time allowed could not be given additional 
time to correct the oversight.171 The Advisory Committee felt that this 
was a needless trap. Maybe, we then thought, one summons served on 
the United States should suffice. I recall suggesting that each post 
office should have a “P.O. Box A: Sue the U.S.” located next to P.O. 
Box 1, where a summons might be served. But we were assured by 
Attorney General Dick Thornburgh that the government absolutely 
 
 168. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-462, § 2, 96 
Stat. 2527, 2527 (codified at 28 U.S.C. app. (2006)). 
 169. See 1 ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS 5-26 to 5-33 (2d ed. 1991) 
(discussing the process provided in the Civil Rules for service by mail and similar approaches 
adopted by the states). 
 170. Robert A. Lusardi, Nationwide Service of Process: Due Process Limitations on the 
Power of the Sovereign, 33 VILL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1988) (claiming that Congress has the power to 
provide for service of process anywhere in the United States even though “it had not exercised 
[that power] statutorily”). 
 171. E.g., Whale v. United States, 792 F.2d 951, 954 (9th Cir. 1986) (refusing to overturn the 
district court’s denial of appellant’s Rule 60(b) motion because the appellant’s counsel’s failure 
to personally serve the U.S. attorney was due to counsel’s own misreading of the rules and 
therefore not justifiable). 
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required multiple notices of any suit filed against it or its officers. We 
did nevertheless manage some easing of suits against the government 
by adding Rule 4(i)(4) to extend the time for correcting a defect in 
service of process on the United States. 
B. The Hague Convention and Formalities of Service Abroad 
The Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and 
Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (Hague 
Convention) posed a greater challenge to the Advisory Committee’s 
work on Rule 4.172 It had been signed in 1965;173 by 1985 it had been 
ratified by the United States and many other nations.174 Rule 4 needed 
to be amended to accommodate the aim of that Hague Convention to 
facilitate transnational litigation and to address the issues presented 
by service of process outside the United States. Among its 
complexities, the Hague Convention obligated signatory nations to 
establish a “Central Authority” that would assume responsibility for 
delivery of the requisite documents to defendants—a role not unlike 
that of the U.S. Marshals until Congress relieved them of it in 1983. 
(And a role that bears some resemblance to the idea of “P.O. Box A: 
Sue U.S.”!) 
As the Advisory Committee considered transnational service of 
process, it also noted that the long arm of the federal courts in claims 
arising under federal law against defendants served outside the 
United States was not as long as recent due process decisions of the 
Supreme Court175 suggested that it might be. Indeed, the Court had 
explicitly invited rulemakers to consider whether the federal arm 
should be extended to secure less-expensive and more-effective 
 
 172. Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or 
Commercial Matters, opened for signature Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, 658 U.N.T.S. 163 
(entered into force Feb. 10, 1969). 
 173. On the role of the United States in its drafting and promotion, see generally Philip W. 
Amram, The Proposed International Convention on the Service of Documents Abroad, 51 
A.B.A. J. 650 (1965); Stephen F. Downs, Note, The Effect of the Hague Convention on Service 
Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 125 (1969). 
 174. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES ch.7.A, intro. note (1986) (“As of 1987, 25 states were parties to the Hague Service 
Convention . . . .”). 
 175. E.g., Arrowsmith v. United Press Int’l, 320 F.2d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 1963) (“There thus 
exists an overwhelming consensus that the amenability of a foreign corporation to suit in a 
federal court in a diversity action is determined in accordance with the law of the state where 
the court sits . . . .”). 
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enforcement of our national law against foreign firms whose practices 
risked harms to our citizens.176 The Advisory Committee resolved that 
a federal plaintiff should be allowed to invoke personal jurisdiction 
over a defendant having “minimum contacts” with the United States, 
even though the contacts with any particular state might be too 
modest to reach the minimum standard to sustain personal 
jurisdiction in any state court. With these numerous thoughts in mind, 
the Advisory Committee proceeded with its reconsideration of Rule 
4.177 
With Congress’s cost-saving device in mind, the Advisory 
Committee was attracted to the prospect of avoiding the costly 
intricacies of compliance with the Hague Convention by asking the 
defendant to waive the Central Authority procedure in a case in 
which that procedure was not needed to provide the requisite 
information to the defendant. The cost savings could be much more 
significant in international than in domestic cases, given that service 
of process through a Central Authority requires that the complaint 
and summons be translated into the language of its officers—even if 
the foreign defendant to be served is entirely fluent in English—and 
is also likely to result in substantial delay, sometimes intentionally 
imposed by governments protective of defendants in their territories. 
Many international firms doing business in the United States have no 
practical need for the Hague Convention’s formalities.178 Toyota does 
not need to see a complaint against it in Japanese. The Advisory 
Committee discussed the proposal with officers of the Department of 
Justice and at informal academic gatherings in Europe. We could see 
no reasonable objection for not applying the requested waiver-of-
service provision to defendants outside the United States, especially 
when a costly, dilatory, and unnecessary translation would be needed. 
The Advisory Committee therefore reorganized Rule 4 to 
address all these purposes, published our draft for comment, and 
 
 176. Omni Capital Int’l v. Rudolph Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 109–10 (1987); see also J. 
Dickson Phillips & Paul D. Carrington, Reflections on the Interface of Treaties and Rules of 
Procedure: Time for Federal Long-Arm Legislation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153, 154 
(Summer 1994) (calling for Congress to pass federal long-arm legislation). 
 177. See generally Joseph F. Weis, Jr., The Federal Rules and the Hague Conventions: 
Concerns of Conformity and Comity, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 903 (1989) (tracing the development of 
Rule 4 after the Hague Conventions). 
 178. E.g., Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corp., 889 F.2d 172, 173–74 (8th Cir. 1989) (permitting 
the plaintiff to serve the defendant based on the procedure in Article 10 rather than through the 
Central Authority as outlined in Articles 2 and 6). 
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heard no objections. The Standing Committee and the Judicial 
Conference then unanimously approved the proposal. 
C. Revision by the Court at the Suggestion of the British Embassy 
But our proposal was quietly revised by our committee chair, 
Judge Pointer, at the behest of the Supreme Court, to insert language 
making the cost-shifting waiver-of-service provision inapplicable to a 
defendant to be served outside the United States.179 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and the Judicial Conference directed the revision in 
response to the protest of the British Embassy. The embassy, 
presumably at the request of officials of the European Union, had 
retained Erwin Griswold, a former solicitor general of the United 
States, to inform the Court and the State Department that our 
proposal was offensive to signatories to the Hague Convention. No 
public consideration of this issue was ever conducted. So much for the 
new practice of transparency required by the revised Rules Enabling 
Act! It seemed to me at the time that the international political 
question raised by the British Embassy was one best resolved by 
Congress on the advice of the executive. 
Just as the House of Representatives responded to the lobbying 
of the ABA on Rule 26 without serious consideration of the political 
issue it addressed, the Court and the Judicial Conference under the 
leadership of Chief Justice Rehnquist responded to lobbying by the 
British Embassy on Rule 4 without public deliberation or 
consideration of the merits of the issue presented. I continue to 
believe that the cost-shifting provision should be applied to a foreign 
defendant who needlessly requires an American plaintiff to procure a 
translation of a summons and complaint when the defendant is fully 
fluent in English and is engaged in activities in the United States that 
give rise to the complaint. I see no conflict with the Hague 
Convention, whose aims are essentially those of Rule 1. I urge the 
Advisory Committee to try once more to get it right.180 
 
 179. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Reluctant Partner: Making Procedural Law for 
International Civil Litigation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 143–48 (Summer 1994) 
(describing how U.S. rulemakers have gone about changing Civil Rules that affect international 
litigation). 
 180. See Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Service by Mail—Is the Stamp of Approval from the Hague 
Convention Always Enough?, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 165, 177 (Summer 1994) (arguing 
that the Civil Rules should focus on the process of service providing notice for international 
defendants rather than on formalities). But see Doug Rendleman, Comment on Judge Joseph F. 
Weis, Jr., Service by Mail—Is the Stamp of Approval from the Hague Convention Always 
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VI.  THE HAGUE EVIDENCE CONVENTION 
A. The Aérospatiale Case 
The usual discovery rules were also applicable to international 
litigation. The Advisory Committee was therefore obliged to consider 
the Hague Evidence Convention bearing on the taking of evidence 
abroad.181 The relation of that treaty to Rule 26 emerged as a problem 
in 1987 in the 5–4 division of the Supreme Court in Société Nationale 
Industrielle Aérospatiale v. United States District Court.182 In that case, 
the French manufacturers of an allegedly defective airplane resisted a 
Rule 34 request for documents bearing on the airplane’s design by 
insisting that the plaintiffs use the formalities provided by the 
Convention. The Convention does impose on the signing nations an 
obligation to cooperate with letters of request addressed not to the 
party from whom evidence is sought but rather to its government, 
with the expectation that the government will in due course secure 
and transmit the evidence. The Court unanimously rejected the 
defendants’ contention that the plaintiffs seeking documents located 
in France were required to pursue them by means of the Letter of 
Request procedure. The majority cautioned district courts to 
“exercise special vigilance to protect foreign litigants from . . . unduly 
burdensome . . . discovery,”183 but left the Convention available as an 
alternate optional means of pursuing information or evidence.184 
Four Justices dissented from “[t]he Court’s view of this country’s 
international obligations.”185 They urged that some deference be 
shown to foreign sovereignty and the international agreement, and 
that the Letter of Request procedure therefore be used as a first 
resort when it is available and adequate to the specific task. 
 
Enough?, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179, 181 (Summer 1994) (arguing that the Civil Rules 
should respect the sovereignty of other nations and their rules of procedure). 
 181. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters, 
opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 (entered into force Oct. 7, 
1972). See generally Lawrence Collins, The Hague Evidence Convention and Discovery: A 
Serious Understanding?, 35 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 765 (1986) (arguing that the Hague Convention 
has been misconceived by U.S. courts and that the Convention applies to evidence at trial but 
not to rules of discovery). 
 182. Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987). 
 183. Id. at 546. 
 184. Id. at 544. 
 185. Id. at 548 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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B. An Effort to Accommodate the Court’s Opinion and the 
Convention in Rule 26 
The issue presented by the two opinions seemed to the Advisory 
Committee to be worthy of broader public consideration. We 
published a draft of an amendment that would require a first resort to 
the Letter of Request procedure if available and suited to the task at 
hand.186 After considering the reactions to that tentative draft, the 
Advisory Committee decided instead to express the opinion of the 
Court in the text of the rule, including a reference to the Letter of 
Request procedure as an option. The Advisory Committee’s purpose 
was, as with the Rule 38 proposal, to assure, if possible, that the Civil 
Rules as published accurately expressed the governing law. 
After the Advisory Committee sent this proposal to the Court, 
the United Kingdom voiced an objection, and the Court remanded 
the matter to the Advisory Committee. When the Advisory 
Committee, upon reconsideration, again resolved that the rule should 
be amended to conform to the rule expressed by the Court, the 
Department of State joined in expressing disapproval, so the Judicial 
Conference laid the matter to rest.187 The majority opinion remains 
the law, and there is still no reference to the Hague Evidence 
Convention in the Civil Rules.188 It seems unlikely that many 
American litigants have been constrained from discovery by courts 
concerned about the need to exhibit respect for foreign 
governments.189 
VII.  RULE 11 SANCTIONS 
The Advisory Committee’s first substantial response to business 
interests’ rising complaints concerning frivolous claims and excessive 
discovery had come in the 1983 amendments to Rule 11. As 
previously noted, those amendments served to permit and encourage 
 
 186. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 127 F.R.D. 237, 318 (1989) (proposing a 
method of requesting information during litigation involving international parties). 
 187. Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 515 (1993). 
 188. For a contemporaneous assessment of the results, see generally Gary B. Born, The 
Hague Evidence Convention Revisited: Reflections on Its Role in U.S. Civil Procedure, 57 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 77 (Summer 1994). 
 189. See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES 
COURTS 198–204 (2008) (discussing how American courts often feel unrestrained by foreign 
rules of discovery). 
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the imposition of monetary sanctions on lawyers responsible for 
asserting meritless motions, claims, and defenses.190 The revision was 
well drafted and—though not entirely free of controversy—won much 
approval at the time of its promulgation. Like many others, I thought 
they had it about right. It did apparently have the effect of causing 
some lawyers to do a bit more homework before filing a claim or 
motion in federal court.191 
A. Abuses of Rule 11 
Yet, although many lawyers told the American Judicature 
Society that they had counseled a client not to file suit in light of Rule 
11, the impact on actual filings was not evident.192 And the 
increasingly frequent resort to Rule 11 begot a substantial and 
adverse reaction from members of the bar. The issues Rule 11 
presented remained at the top of the Advisory Committee’s agenda 
for at least four years. Among the complaints were that the newly 
revised rule (1) gave rise to a new industry of Rule 11 motion practice 
adding to cost and delay; (2) stimulated incivility between lawyers; (3) 
was usually aimed at plaintiff’s counsel, leaving defense counsel 
unrestrained in the assertion of unfounded denials; and (4) 
encouraged judges to indulge their occasional personal animus 
toward individual lawyers, sometimes by belated sua sponte rulings 
coming after a dispute seemed to have been resolved.193 Another 
 
 190. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165, 167–68 (1983). 
 191. See generally AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION: THE 
REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11, at 
68–72 (Stephen B. Burbank ed., 1989) (discussing the impact of the changes to Rule 11 on civil 
rights plaintiffs); N.Y. STATE BAR COMM. ON FED. COURTS, SANCTIONS & ATTORNEYS’ FEES 
12 (1987); THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE RULE 11 SANCTIONING PROCESS 
158–59 (1988) (describing how changes to Rule 11 had impacted lawyers’ approach to pleadings 
and motions). 
 192. See generally ELIZABETH C. WIGGINS, THOMAS WILLGING & DONNA STIENSTRA, FJC 
RULE 11: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES OF THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (1991) (providing an overview of the application of Rule 
11 in federal courts). 
 193. See Paul D. Carrington & Andrew Wasson, A Reflection on Rulemaking: The Rule 11 
Experience, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 563, 566 (2004); Herbert Kritzer, Lawrence Marshall & 
Frances K. Zemans, Rule 11: Moving Beyond the Cosmic Anecdote, 75 JUDICATURE 259, 269 
(1992); William W Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1013 (1988); Gerald 
Solovy & Laura A. Kaster, Rule 11: Framework for Debate, 61 MISS. L.J. 1, 1 (1991). 
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complaint heard was that the rule was deterring private enforcement 
of public law, at least in the field of antitrust law.194 
A Third Circuit task force, organized by the American 
Judicature Society and served by Professor Stephen Burbank, voiced 
many of these concerns.195 Perhaps in part because of Congressman 
Kastenmeier’s recent revisions to the Rules Enabling Act, the 
Advisory Committee sought public comments on the efficacy of Rule 
11, with ten specific questions posed for response.196 The Advisory 
Committee also, perhaps for the first time, specifically requested that 
the Administrative Office gather data on the effects of the Rule. No 
fewer than three books were published by eminent authors reporting 
the emerging case law to the lawyers caught in Rule 11’s toils.197 
Numerous hearings in diverse locations were conducted to hear the 
views of lawyers and judges who had used the Rule. Their responses 
were not reassuring. Not only were hostility levels elevated, but 
lawyers were routinely asking judges to consider sanctions to punish 
many, and perhaps most, lawyers whose motions they had denied.198 
Lawyers were making Rule 11 motions to sanction Rule 11 motions. 
And there was reason to believe that sanctions were imposed 
disproportionately on civil rights plaintiffs.199 
 
 194. Daniel E. Lazaroff, Rule 11 and Federal Antitrust Litigation, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1034, 1039 
(1993). 
 195. See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Report of the Third Circuit Task Force on 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11: An Update, 19 SETON HALL L. REV. 511 (1989) (providing a 
summary of the task force’s work); Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil 
Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925 (1989) (casting the amendment to 
Rule 11 as part of an effort to bring uniformity and predictability to the enforcement of the Civil 
Rules and to help cases be adjudicated on the merits). 
 196. Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure, Judicial Conference of the U.S., Call for 
Comments, 131 F.R.D. 335 (1990). 
 197. GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE (2d ed. 
1994); JEROLD S. SOLOVY & CHARLES M. SHAFFER, JR., RULE 11 AND OTHER SANCTIONS: 
NEW ISSUES IN FEDERAL LITIGATION (1987); GEORGENE M. VAIRO, RULE 11 SANCTIONS: 
CASE LAW PERSPECTIVES AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES (Richard G. Johnson ed., 3d ed. 2004). 
 198. See Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11—Some “Chilling” 
Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1325–38 
(1986) (discussing the application of Rule 11 during the first two years after it was amended). 
 199. See Mark Spiegel, The Rule 11 Studies and Civil Rights Cases: An Inquiry into the 
Neutrality of Procedural Rules, 32 CONN. L. REV. 155, 156 (1999) (suggesting that civil rights 
cases involve a disproportionate number of Rule 11 motions). 
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B. Reforming Rule 11 
One thought was to fully restore the discretion of the trial judge 
being asked to impose sanctions on an adversary. It was also 
suggested that the hostility might be reduced by a safe harbor 
provision that would require sanctions motions to be made promptly 
in direct response to the challenged action of counsel, and that a 
modest time would be allowed for the withdrawal of the challenged 
motion or allegation if the moving party detected that the sanctions 
motion might have merit. The Advisory Committee circulated a draft 
to that effect and received more comments. Hearings were held. We 
made revisions in response to the comments and recommended a 
draft to the Standing Committee that included the safe harbor 
provision and a modest constraint on judicial discretion in the 
administration of the rule. The Standing Committee debated the draft 
at length and made further revisions, including the restoration of 
judicial discretion.200 The draft as revised became law in 1993, over the 
dissents of Justices Scalia and Thomas, who vigorously protested that 
the revision was premature and that more trial lawyers needed to be 
punished.201 The factual basis of their opinion was not disclosed; they 
clearly disregarded the data gathered by the Administrative Office. I 
could not help but notice that neither was an experienced litigator. 
Whether our 1993 revision of Rule 11 was benign I leave to 
others to say.202 It did for at least a time quell the concern for the 
civility of the federal legal process. For better or worse, the rule 
apparently continued to impede the assertion of civil rights claims of 
employees by contingent fee lawyers reluctant to risk sanctions.203 It 
did not succeed in settling the law on sanctions. For example, 
questions remained about whether the need for a separate motion on 
 
 200. For a review of all the changes, see generally Georgene M. Vairo, The New Rule 11: 
Past as Prologue?, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 39 (1994). 
 201. Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 507–10 (1993) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 202. More tinkering would be needed. See Maureen N. Armour, Practice Makes Perfect: 
Judicial Discretion and the 1993 Amendments to Rule 11, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677, 777–81 
(1996) (proposing a method to make the enforcement of Rule 11 more predictable and 
consistent). A later assessment is Margaret L. Sanner & Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Rule Revision, 
37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 573 (2004), which argues that although the 1993 amendments seem to have 
corrected the problems with the 1983 amendments, “the experience with the 1983 amendment 
may have undermined confidence in the rule revision process of judges, counsel and litigants.” 
Id. at 574. 
 203. For thoughtful consideration of the issue, see generally Spiegel, supra note 199. 
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sanctions was indispensable and whether the safe harbor provision 
was to be strictly enforced.204 
C. Inherent Judicial Power 
And it did not calm the Justices who had in 1991 chosen to 
disregard the constraining text of Rule 11 to hold, over the dissent of 
Justice Scalia and others, that federal district judges have inherent 
power to punish lawyers and their clients for persisting in the 
presentation of a frivolous—indeed fraudulent—defense, sometimes 
in the face of orders of the court.205 The Court observed that the 
conduct to be punished in the case presented included much conduct 
not reached by Rule 11 because it was not reflected in pleadings or 
motions, nor was it entirely within reach of the contempt power. The 
Court concluded that neither Rule 11 nor the statute forbidding 
lawyers to engage in vexatious behavior206 was applicable to much of 
the misconduct, but that this lack of explicit authority should not 
preclude a court from doing whatever was necessary to prevent 
abuse.207 The Court urged judges to use Rule 11 when applicable but 
not to be constrained by its limitation in circumstances in which 
lawyers needed to be punished.208 In so holding, the Court relied in 
part on its earlier decision209 upholding the power of the district court 
to dismiss a civil claim for failure to prosecute even though the 
defendant had made no motion to dismiss, notwithstanding the 
explicit language of Rule 41(b) requiring such a motion as a 
precondition to dismissal. Implicit in the Court’s holding was the 
 
 204. See Danielle Hart, Still Chilling After All These Years: Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and Its Impact on Federal Civil Rights Plaintiffs After the 1993 Amendments, 37 
VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 42–49 (2002) (discussing the split in the federal courts of appeal over the safe 
harbor provisions). 
 205. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45–46 (1991). Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justices Kennedy and Souter dissented from the Court’s decision, id. at 60 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting), alongside a separate dissent from Justice Scalia, id. at 58 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 206. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2006). 
 207. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 50 (“But if in the informed discretion of the court, neither the 
statute nor the Rules are up to the task [of sanctioning an attorney for bad conduct], the court 
may safely rely on its own inherent power.”). 
 208. Id. 
 209. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962) (“The authority of a court to 
dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution has generally been considered an ‘inherent power,’ 
governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their 
own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.”). 
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suggestion that Rule 11 might perhaps be deleted as an unnecessary 
impediment to judges seeking to do the right thing. 
VIII.  THE SUPREME COURT’S ROLE AS PROCEDURAL LAWMAKER: 
RULES 56 AND 8 
A. Rule 56: The 1986 Trilogy 
The relation of the rulemakers to the Supreme Court was of 
greatest concern in the Advisory Committee’s consideration of Rule 
56. The concern was aroused by a trilogy of cases handed down by the 
Supreme Court in 1986.210 The Advisory Committee viewed those 
decisions as revising the rule to permit district judges to render 
summary judgments more freely than the Court’s previous 
interpretations of the rule’s text seemed to allow—and, in many 
minds,211 including mine, more freely than the text of the rule could 
reasonably be said to intend. The trilogy proved to be a foretaste of 
another, even more radical, revision of the Civil Rules that the Court 
would fashion in 2007212 and 2009.213 
Rule 56, governing summary judgment, had been promulgated in 
its original form in 1938 as an adoption of a procedure used in 
 
 210. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 
U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
 211. See Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary 
Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 74 (1990) (arguing that the costs of the new summary judgment 
standard will outweigh the benefits); Miller, supra note 43, at 1073–74 (noting that an expansion 
of summary judgment “not only would be unfortunate, but would be completely inconsistent 
with the philosophy and principles of the Federal Rules”); Melissa L. Nelken, One Step 
Forward, Two Steps Back: Summary Judgment After Celotex, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 53, 83 (1988) 
(claiming that the standard for admissibility in summary judgment proceedings “has no support 
in Rule 56”); D. Michael Risinger, Another Step in the Counter-Revolution: A Summary 
Judgment on the Supreme Court’s New Approach to Summary Judgment, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 35, 
35 (1988) (arguing that the new summary judgment standard favors defendants over plaintiffs). 
See generally Steven A. Childress, A New Era for Summary Judgments, 116 F.R.D. 183 (1987) 
(arguing that the new Supreme Court decisions will lead to an increase in the number of 
summary judgment motions that are granted); Jack H. Friedenthal, Cases on Summary 
Judgment: Has There Been a Material Change?, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 770 (1988) (discussing 
the impact of Anderson, Matsushita, and Celotex on how courts should approach summary 
judgment motions). 
 212. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). Edward Cavanagh argues that in 
Twombly “the Supreme Court changed its tune dramatically” on pleading requirements. 
Edward D. Cavanagh, Twombly, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Courts, 82 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 877, 878 (2008). 
 213. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
CARRINGTON IN FINAL.DOC 11/29/2010  6:56:44 PM 
646 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:597 
England for a half century and in numerous states.214 Its aim was to 
enable the trial judge to spare the court and the parties the cost of a 
trial when its outcome was certain. A classic 1940 interpretation said 
that “[i]ts purpose is not to cut litigants off from their right of trial by 
jury if they really have evidence which they will offer on a trial.”215 
The aim was to inquire before trial, but after discovery, whether such 
evidence existed. The moving party assumed the burden “to show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material issue of fact.”216 
The 1986 opinions of the Court rewriting Rule 56 have been 
more frequently cited “than any judicial decisions in the history of 
American jurisprudence.”217 Respected scholars saw the opinions as 
having the effect of reviving the fact-pleading standards that were the 
primary feature of the nineteenth-century codes that had often led to 
decisions based on perceived flaws in the texts of complaints and 
answers.218 
B. Revising Rule 56? 
The Advisory Committee believed that, among other effects, the 
trilogy’s widening of the summary judgment procedure rendered Rule 
56 misleading. It questioned whether lawyers could retain faith in the 
text crafted through the rulemaking process established by Congress. 
To many, in deciding to depart from the text of the Rule, the Court 
seemed to have manifested a measure of disrespect for a rulemaking 
 
 214. See John A. Bauman, The Evolution of the Summary Judgment Procedure: An Essay 
Commemorating the Centennial Anniversary of Keating’s Act, 31 IND. L.J. 329, 344 (1956) 
(asserting that early summary judgment procedure in England reached “its ultimate 
extension . . . in the United States by the adoption of Federal Rule 56”); Charles E. Clark & 
Charles U. Samenow, The Summary Judgment, 38 YALE L.J. 423, 423 (1929) (examining “the 
rules and decisions concerning summary procedure in the jurisdictions where it ha[d] already 
been adopted” by 1929, which included England and several American states such as New 
Jersey, New York, and Michigan). 
 215. Whitaker v. Coleman, 115 F.2d 305, 307 (5th Cir. 1940). 
 216. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(2). 
 217. Adam N. Steinman, An Ounce of Prevention: Solving Some Unforeseen Problems with 
the Proposed Amendments to Rule 56 and the Federal Summary Judgment Process, 103 NW. U. 
L. REV. COLLOQUY 230, 230 (2008), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/Colloquy/
2008/45/LRColl2008n45Steinman.pdf (citing Adam N. Steinman, The Irrepressible Myth of 
Celotex: Reconsidering Summary Judgment Burdens Twenty Years After the Trilogy, 63 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 81, 143 (2006)). 
 218. Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 435, 437 (1986); see also Miller, supra note 43, at 1016–19 
(discussing historical summary-judgment procedures and suggesting that Rule 56 was adopted 
to balance out the new generous pleading and joinder requirements, which would not 
sufficiently terminate frivolous claims before trial). 
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process that had been designed to assure the well-informed 
disinterest of those responsible for the creation and revision of 
transsubstantive procedural rules. Because the extension of the 
summary judgment rule diminished the prospects of many kinds of 
plaintiffs,219 the three decisions together could also be seen to reflect a 
substantive political agenda to assist the contemporaneous 
deregulation movement. 
Among my tasks in my first years as Reporter was considering 
how to rewrite the pertinent language of Rule 56 to make it consistent 
with the three Supreme Court decisions. The Advisory Committee 
was moved to accept the Court’s dictation, and I tried to draft a rule 
more consistent with the Court’s opinions. I recall that the Advisory 
Committee held one of its meetings in a conference room at the 
Supreme Court. Chief Justice Rehnquist happened by and expressed 
interest in our agenda. He warmly approved of the idea of rewriting 
Rule 56. But he did not stay to help with the task. 
The Advisory Committee did, after an extended period of study 
and reflection, approve a revised draft of Rule 56. In fairness, none of 
us were sure we had it right. We sought to reconcile the text of the 
rule with the 1986 trilogy and also to clarify the use of the rule to 
resolve specific claims or issues even when the whole case could not 
be summarily resolved.220 
C. The Decision to Amend Rule 50 but Not Rule 56 
We also tinkered with Rule 50 for the purpose of linking it to the 
proposed text of Rule 56.221 Our proposal for Rule 50 became law, but 
our proposal for Rule 56 did not. Although other questions were 
discussed, the argument that seemed to prevail in the Standing 
Committee against the revision of Rule 56 was that it would be 
inappropriate for our committees to trespass on a lawmaking role that 
the high Court had appropriated for itself. I was not the only person 
 
 219. Risinger, supra note 211, at 39 (contending that the Celotex trilogy “introduced a 
procedure which is asymmetrical, grossly favoring defendants over plaintiffs no matter which 
party is the movant”). 
 220. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, FED. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 
MEETING OF APRIL 13–15, 1992, MINUTES OF MEETING, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/RulesandPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV04-1992-min.pdf. 
 221. See Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: 
An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 
2067, 2109–10 (1989) (observing the “significant relationship between Rule 56 and Rule 50” and 
detailing the advantages that would result from “uniting the terminology” of the two rules). 
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present who was resistant to what seemed to be misplaced modesty 
and deference by those to whom Congress had assigned the role of 
disinterested drafting of procedural law for its nonpartisan approval. 
The premise of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 that still governs 
the Judicial Conference is that courts of first instance should be 
bound to adhere to preexisting procedure rules crafted by the 
Conference and its committees but subject to Supreme Court 
approval and congressional acquiescence, just as they are bound to 
respect and enforce congressional legislation. The Supreme Court 
seemed to have departed from that premise in the 1986 trilogy; it was 
seen by many to have rewritten Rule 56 in a moment of judicial 
activism.222 The Advisory Committee has in recent times reflected, 
perhaps at length, on possible revisions of Rule 56, and modest 
changes are due to take effect in 2010.223 But it seems that no 
substantial changes considered to date by the Advisory Committee 
can be validated by reference to empirical data gathered by the 
Federal Judicial Center. Quibbling continues over the auxiliary verbs 
embedded in the text. Judge Brock Hornby has advanced a worthy 
suggestion that summary judgment proceedings be made more 
transparent by requiring public hearings before Article III judges on 
such motions.224 Alas, that suggestion may be too radical to gain 
traction. 
D. Twombly: The Supreme Court Rewrites Rule 8 
If there was doubt that the Court was rewriting the Civil Rules to 
conform to the political preferences of a majority of the Justices, the 
doubt was resolved in 2007 and 2009. Its 2007 decision in Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly,225 requiring that pleading be plausible to the judge, 
rested in part on the fact that the claim was one arising under the 
federal antitrust law. The majority of the Court expressed skepticism 
 
 222. For an in-depth analysis of the term “judicial activism” and its political implications, 
see generally Neil S. Siegel, Interring the Rhetoric of Judicial Activism, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 555 
(2010). 
 223. See Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 
1945 (2009) (“[T]he federal rulemakers are now readying to amend Rule 56, with a projected 
effective date of December 1, 2010. They would include new procedures requiring parties to 
state the facts assertedly uncontested and to respond thereto; the rule also would clarify judicial 
options when a party fails to respond to a motion and would recognize the practice of moving 
for partial summary judgment.” (footnote omitted)). 
 224. D. Brock Hornby, Summary Judgments Without Illusions, 13 GREEN BAG 2D 273, 284–
86 (2010). 
 225. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
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about the virtue of antitrust plaintiffs as a group. This skepticism was 
apparently sufficient to justify what the Court saw as a more-rigorous 
application of Rules 8 and 12—namely, a greater readiness to render 
judgments on the pleadings—to antitrust plaintiffs’ suspect claims.226 
This approach, departing from the aim of transsubstantivity 
embedded in the 1934 Act,227 would foreclose wasteful discovery by 
plaintiffs deemed by the judge to be unlikely to be able to find the 
requisite evidence of conspiratorial misconduct even by free use of 
discovery. 
The Court in Twombly took no notice of the efforts to reform 
discovery practice in which the Advisory Committee has been 
engaged since the “judicial case management” reforms of 1983, but 
relied on Judge Easterbrook’s unfounded 1989 declaration that the 
Civil Rules are not working.228 No notice was taken by the Court of 
the 1993 amendments to the discovery rules with which we had 
addressed the issues raised by Judge Easterbrook.229 Given all the 
reforms in place, Professor Thomas Rowe was moved to observe that 
“[d]iscovery must be a fearsome Gulliver to require all those 
strings . . . to tie him down.”230 Nor did the Court take notice of the 
mass of data calling into question Judge Easterbrook’s assessment, or 
of the fact that Lord Harry Woolf of Barnes had in the 1990s studied 
 
 226. Id. at 557–60 (holding that “something beyond the mere possibility of loss of causation 
must be alleged, lest a plaintiff with ‘a largely groundless claim’ be allowed to” take up other 
people’s time (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005))); see also Stephen 
B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules,” 2009 WIS. L. REV. 535, 549 
(“[E]ven if animated by the perceived substantive or procedural needs of antitrust law and 
litigation, Twombly’s choices cannot comfortably be confined to that context by reason of 
another foundational assumption, one that the Court has emphatically endorsed in the pleading 
context on more than one occasion. General rules made through the Enabling Act Process can 
only be changed through that process (or by legislation).” (footnote omitted)). 
 227. See supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text. 
 228. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559, 560 n.6.; supra note 134. 
 229. This oversight was promptly noted in Cavanagh, supra note 163, at 573–75, but not by 
the Court. Also unnoticed were reforms of state laws permitting, in limited circumstances, 
prefiling discovery. See Scott Dodson, Federal Pleading and State Presuit Discovery, 14 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 43, 45–46 (2010) (“[M]any state rules permit presuit discovery, and several do 
so for the express purpose of drafting a sufficient complaint.”). 
 230. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Authorized Managerialism Under the Federal Rules—and the 
Extent of Convergence with Civil-Law Judging, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 191, 202 (2007). 
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the federal court experience231 before importing the practice of case 
management into the United Kingdom’s Civil Procedure Act 1997.232 
E. Substance, Not Mere Procedure? Consequences for Antitrust  
Law Enforcement 
The Court’s opinion in Twombly also showed surprising 
disregard for the character of antitrust law that led to a contrary 
position in 1962, when the Court cautioned that “summary 
procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation in 
which motive and intent play leading roles, the proof is largely in the 
hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the 
plot.”233 That 1962 caution is no less apt in 2010.234 But whereas the 
Court in 1962 had seen a duty to interpret the Civil Rules to favor 
antitrust law enforcement in the setting of a motion to avoid trial, the 
Court in 2007 saw itself as having a contrary duty to protect business 
firms from the expense even of enduring the discovery process in an 
antitrust case if, in a court’s intuitive judgment, the claim seemed 
unlikely to be a winner. Never mind that withholding access to 
discovery will inevitably prevent some meritorious claims from being 
heard and will relax business entities’ concern for the legal 
consequences of schemes abusing economic power. Never mind that 
the European Union is now finding it increasingly important to 
enhance private enforcement of its competition law.235 
 
 231. See THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE LORD WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: FINAL 
REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND 
WALES (1996). 
 232. Civil Procedure Act 1997, c. 12 (U.K.); Déirdre Dwyer, Introduction to THE CIVIL 
PROCEDURE RULES TEN YEARS ON 1, 9–14 (Déirdre Dwyer ed., 2009). One commentator has 
reported that the practice has been less effective than hoped. See Adrian Zuckerman, Litigation 
Management under the CPR: A Poorly-Used Management Infrastructure, in THE CIVIL 
PROCEDURE RULES TEN YEARS ON, supra, at 89, 89 (contending that the civil procedure 
reforms had “failed to achieve the hoped for benefits”). 
 233. Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1961). 
 234. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Pleading Problem in Antitrust Cases and Beyond, 95 
IOWA L. REV. BULL. 55, 66 (2010), http://www.uiowa.edu/~ilr/bulletin/ILRB_95_Hovenkamp
.pdf (concluding that although “Twombly clearly reached the correct conclusion . . . it could 
have done less damage to the values of notice pleading stated in the Federal Rules had it 
focused more narrowly on the mechanisms by which anticompetitive agreements are proven”). 
Hovenkamp distinguishes geographic market division from parallel pricing: “For all of [the 
Court’s] lengthy discussion about the facts essential to a good complaint, the Supreme Court 
paid little attention to the difference between price fixing and market division.” Id. at 62. 
 235. See Janet L. McDavid & Howard Weber, E.U. Private Actions, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 25, 
2005, at 13 (“Europe’s competition law leaders have indicated that enhancing private 
enforcement is one of their top priorities.”). 
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F. The Role of the Court in Legislating New Pleading Rules 
The opinion of the Court in Twombly manifested an even more 
obvious and drastic disregard of the text of Rule 8 than the disregard 
of Rule 56 that the Court had manifested in 1986.236 Rule 8 is the 
keystone of civil procedure under the 1938 Civil Rules scheme.237 The 
Court did not observe the dictum of the late Chief Justice Rehnquist 
that access to discovery could not be restricted without an 
amendment of Rules 8 and 9.238 As recently as 2002, the Court had 
unanimously confirmed that the only means available for foreclosing 
discovery was a summary judgment under Rule 56.239 
Professors Kevin Clermont and Stephen Yeazell have forcefully 
noted a basic problem with the Court’s disregard for the text of Rule 
8.240 They argue that Rule 8 authorizes prediscovery judgments only 
when the facts alleged in a complaint are legally insufficient: if 
everything alleged were true, the plaintiff would still lose on the 
merits.241 A test of plausibility empowers judges to terminate a civil 
case if they are unwilling to consider the possibility that the plaintiff 
would be able to prove the allegations. This is not to be mistaken for 
a revival of the nineteenth-century code-pleading requirement that 
facts be pleaded in sufficient detail to signal the issues to be addressed 
by evidence presented at trial, although the phrase “heightened fact 
pleading” sometimes used to describe Twombly suggests that 
connection.242 Because the decision of the district court invoking the 
heightened pleading standard is a decision on an issue of law and not 
 
 236. See cases cited supra note 210. 
 237. WRIGHT, supra note 26, at 467. 
 238. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 
168–69 (1993). 
 239. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S 506, 512–13 (2002); see also Crawford-El v. 
Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600 (1998) (“[S]ummary judgment serves as the ultimate screen to weed 
out truly insubstantial lawsuits prior to trial.”). 
 240. See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 4 (detailing the Court’s recent pleading cases and 
contending that these cases have destabilized the civil litigation system). 
 241. See id. at 825 (describing the original conception of Rule 8’s pleading requirements as 
giving “fair notice of the pleader’s basic contentions” and “pass[ing] most of the screening 
function from the threshold to the later stages of litigation”). 
 242. See id. at 841–42 (stressing that measuring plausibility “lies entirely in the mind of the 
beholder” and that beholders “wearing judicial robes ha[ve] precious little interpretive guidance 
given the measure’s novelty in the law”). 
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on an issue of fact, a likely consequence of Twombly will be a 
significant increase in the rate of civil appeals.243 
Nor did the Court acknowledge that stare decisis has long been 
said to have special value when judges are interpreting legislation,244 a 
principle perhaps having special application to legal texts the Court 
itself has promulgated, with the assent of Congress, on the advice of 
disinterested and well-informed experts. 
The Court’s disregard of Congress and its own precedents in re-
writing antitrust law in Twombly was dramatized by its 
contemporaneous decision, Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, 
Ltd.,245 applying the law enacted by Congress to impose heightened 
pleading requirements in private securities fraud actions.246 The 
 
 243. See Kevin M. Clermont, Three Myths About Twombly–Iqbal 9–10 (Jul. 6, 2010) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=1613327; see also Jason Bartlett, Comment, Into the Wild: The Uneven and Self-Defeating 
Effects of Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 24 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 73, 109 (2009) (“Where 
dismissals are granted with prejudice, the appeals process will sometimes interfere with the 
pursuit of limiting costs.”). Compare Issacharoff & Lowenstein, supra note 211, at 73–75 
(contending that the broad concept of summary judgment promulgated by the trilogy will 
effectively reduce unnecessary litigation, but not without counterbalancing consequences), with 
D. Theodore Rave, Note, Questioning the Efficiency of Summary Judgment, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
875, 875 (2006) (questioning the idea that a robust summary-judgment regime leads to increased 
litigation efficiency and concluding that more empirical data is needed to make an informed 
judgment). 
 244. See Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295 (1996) (“Once we have determined a 
statute’s meaning, we adhere to our ruling under the doctrine of stare decisis . . . . One reason 
that we give great weight to stare decisis in the area of statutory construction is that ‘Congress is 
free to change this Court’s interpretation of its legislation.’” (quoting Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 
431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977))); see also Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 259 (1998) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (contending that stare decisis concerns common to statutory interpretation cases 
should not be diminished “in the case of a procedural rule”). 
 245. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007). 
 246. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 
109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.), requires plaintiffs 
invoking federal securities laws to “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference 
that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006). In 
Tellabs, Inc., Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, held: 
It does not suffice that a reasonable factfinder plausibly could infer from the 
complaint’s allegations the requisite state of mind. Rather, to determine whether a 
complaint’s scienter allegations can survive threshold inspection for sufficiency, a 
court governed by § 21D(b)(2) must engage in a comparative evaluation; it must 
consider, not only inferences urged by the plaintiff . . . but also competing inferences 
rationally drawn from the facts alleged. An inference of fraudulent intent may be 
plausible, yet less cogent than other, nonculpable explanations for the defendant’s 
conduct. To qualify as “strong” within the intendment of § 21D(b)(2), we hold, an 
inference of scienter must be more than merely plausible or reasonable—it must be 
cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent. 
Tellabs, Inc., 551 U.S. at 314. 
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Justices could hardly have failed to notice that Congress knows how 
to impose more rigorous procedural requirements in a substance-
specific class of cases and had declined to impose any such 
requirements on antitrust plaintiffs. 
Nor did the Court in Twombly observe that its assessment of the 
plausibility of a plaintiff’s allegations cast the Justices, as well as the 
trial judge, into the factfinding role of the civil jury. Scholars also 
observed that oversight in an unrelated case in which the Justices 
viewed the films of an automobile accident to decide for themselves 
whether there was fault.247 Subsequent viewing of the film by diverse 
others demonstrated that reasonable minds could differ and that the 
differences were not without relationship to demographic 
differences.248 Similarly, the Court in 2010 yielded to the temptation to 
preempt the discretion of federal trial judges on such questions as 
whether a television camera might be allowed in a courtroom249 or 
whether to award an enhanced fee to a civil rights attorney.250 
The Court also disregarded the text of Rule 9. That Rule has 
always modified the basic principle of Rule 8 by setting a heightened 
standard of pleading for fraud. The 1995 securities law enacted by 
Congress was in this respect merely an elaboration and reinforcement 
of Rule 9.251 According to the rule, fraud victims should be able to tell 
us on which bits of disinformation they relied. Professor Spencer has 
 
 247. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378–81 (2007) (holding that the court of appeals should 
have “viewed the facts in the light depicted by the videotape,” which, in the Court’s view, “quite 
clearly contradict[ed]” the respondent’s claim that the chase created little threat to other 
motorists or pedestrians). 
 248. See Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going 
to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 903–
06 (2009) (arguing that in Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), the Court “invoked brute sense 
impressions to justify its decision,” yet when the videotape was allowed to speak for itself in an 
empirical study “what it sa[id] depend[ed] on to whom it [was] speaking”). These authors polled 
1,350 citizens who viewed the film. Id. at 845. Although a majority drew the same conclusion as 
the majority of the Court, their reactions were shown to reflect differences of class, race, and 
party affiliation. Id. at 903. 
 249. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S. Ct. 705, 714–15 (2010) (per curiam). 
 250. See Perdue v. Kenny A., 130 S. Ct. 1662, 1676 (2010); see also Paul Gewirtz, Op-Ed, 
Supreme Court Press, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2010, at A23 (citing Kenny A. as an example of “lower 
profile” judicial activism, which should receive more attention “because it is another important 
way the current Supreme Court is using its power to shape and restrict government decisions”). 
 251. See Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 612 (2002) 
(“The general particularity requirement of the PSLRA was designed to codify Rule 9(b)’s 
application to securities fraud cases.”). 
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rightly questioned how there can be yet another specially heightened 
standard not expressed in Rule 9.252 
G. Substantive Political Consequences 
The Court’s plausibility standard has posed a serious problem for 
private enforcers of antitrust law, a body of law that, as enacted in the 
nineteenth century, depends heavily on private enforcement.253 
Antitrust law requires the antitrust plaintiff to learn what the 
defendant alone may know. Professor Scott Dodson has aptly 
described the relationship between the parties as an “information 
asymmetry,”254 which is just what the discovery rules were 
promulgated to correct. 
And one is also left to wonder what the Court proposes to do 
with plaintiffs who present as their complaint one of the forms 
appended to the Civil Rules as models of what is expected of 
pleaders. Form 11, for example, merely alleges that the defendant 
negligently drove a motor vehicle into the plaintiff.255 This pleading 
may not meet the Court’s new standard. 
H. Next Comes Iqbal 
One who shared the politics of procedural lawmakers such as 
Bentham, Field, Pound, and Clark could hope that Twombly was just 
 
 252. Spencer, supra note 103, at 473–77. The special standard applicable to habeas corpus 
proceedings under Habeas Rule 2(c) is also notable. Id. at 477–78. 
 253. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 
57–62 (2005); see also PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FUNDAMENTALS OF 
ANTITRUST LAW § 3.03 (3d ed. 2004) (implying that private enforcement is crucial to antitrust 
law by noting that treble damages are a statutory “lure” to “energize” private antitrust 
litigation). See generally THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND 
RELATED STATUTES 34–35 (Earl W. Kintner ed., 1978) (stressing that the inclusion of a private 
right of action in the Sherman Act was intended to deter antitrust violations, and that private 
litigation has been significant in the development of antitrust case law). 
 254. Scott Dodson, Essay, Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. 
L. REV. IN BRIEF 135, 139 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/07/09/
dodson.pdf (quoting Professor Randy Picker in challenging “the Court’s suspicions that the 
[Twombly] pleading standard only will bar cases that have no ‘reasonably founded hope’ of 
‘reveal[ing] relevant evidence’ in discovery” (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 559 (2007))). Professor Spencer added that “[w]hen such information is unknown or 
unknowable from the plaintiff’s perspective at the pleading stage, the doctrine is too unforgiving 
and unaccommodating, leaving plaintiffs with potentially valid claims with no access to the 
system.” A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1, 36 
(2009). 
 255. FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11. 
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an antitrust case to be understood as an expression of the Court’s 
ambition to protect business interests from claims brought under a 
federal law of which the Justices disapprove, and not as an assault on 
the Civil Rules and the political process by which those laws were 
made. But the Court’s 2009 opinion in Ashcroft v. Iqbal256 dissolved 
that hope. 
Iqbal’s allegation that the defendants were among the public 
officials responsible for his harsh treatment when there was no 
evidence legitimating his arrest as a terrorist in violation of federal 
law seemed to be, in the Court’s view, unworthy of belief and 
therefore unworthy of investigation through the use of the discovery 
rules.257 The defendants’ qualified immunity as public officials 
ostensibly doing their duty became, in the Court’s opinion, an 
absolute immunity depriving Iqbal of access to the evidence he would 
have needed to prove his allegations. The Court worked this 
deprivation despite the defendants’ concession that they would be 
liable if they had knowledge of the mistreatment of Iqbal and had 
been deliberately indifferent to his mistreatment. Because a majority 
of the Justices found Iqbal’s allegations implausible, the Court 
directed the district court to terminate his case prior to factual 
investigation. This action was inconsistent with the text of Rule 8, 
which explicitly entitles Iqbal to proceed to prove the facts alleged if 
they would entitle him to relief.258 The Court’s decisions disregarding 
the text of Rule 8 as interpreted by generations of federal judges 
make its earlier 1986 disregard of the law of Rule 56 seem restrained 
in comparison. 
I. Up with Deregulation! Down with Private Law Enforcement! 
Advocates of deregulation may well celebrate the opinion in 
Iqbal as a major step in the dismantling of the system of private 
enforcement of public law established in 1938. It is a happy day for 
Vice President Quayle’s Council on Competitiveness, which sought in 
1990 to enhance business profits by disabling citizen plaintiffs from 
enforcing laws made to protect them from the consequences of risky 
profit seeking. Gregory Katsas, a former assistant attorney general in 
 
 256. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 257. See id. at 1950–51 (concluding that Iqbal’s complaint was deficient under Rule 8 
because it had not “‘nudged [his] claims’ of invidious discrimination ‘across the line from 
conceivable to plausible’” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)). 
 258. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). 
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the George W. Bush administration, has made the astonishing 
prediction that overruling Twombly and Iqbal “would threaten to 
upset pleading rules that have been well-settled for decades, and 
thereby open the floodgates for what lawyers call ‘fishing 
expeditions’—intrusive and expensive discovery into implausible and 
insubstantial claims.”259 In what decades has Mr. Katsas been 
practicing? Has he read Rule 1?260 Supporters of the opinions have 
even argued, in a gesture of remarkable incivility, that the Court’s 
activism in preventing private law enforcement is a response to the 
need to fight the War on Terror.261 Those who respect Rule 8 favor 
terrorism! 
J. Down with the Rulemaking Process? 
The Court seems, not in these cases alone, to have lost the self-
discipline required to show appropriate respect for the procedural 
lawmaking system Congress established in 1934. And the Court has 
not observed the principle of self-restraint in respecting the work of 
the Judicial Conference that it had voiced as recently as 1999.262 That 
principle is now one of convenience to the Court.263 A majority of the 
Justices seem unaware of their duty to obey and enforce the law made 
by the humble rulemaking process. As Judge Anthony Scirica has 
recently observed, 
 
 259. Access to Justice Denied: Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 33 
(2009) (statement of Gregory G. Katsas, Former Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t. of Justice). 
 260. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“[The Rules] shall be construed and administered to secure the 
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.”). 
 261. See William McGurn, Terror by Trial Lawyer, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 2009, at A17 
(speculating that a legislative proposal to relax pleading standards in response to Iqbal might 
encourage captured al Qaeda operatives to “go on discovery expeditions against, say, Gen. 
David Petraeus or Defense Secretary Robert Gates,” potentially diminishing “the ability of 
these men to prosecute the war”). 
 262. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 861 (1999) (“The nub of our position is 
that we are bound to follow Rule 23 as we understood it upon its adoption, and that we are not 
free to alter it except through the process prescribed by Congress in the Rules Enabling Act.”). 
 263. The Court has recently expressed deference to the statutory rulemaking process to 
consider fashioning a new rule governing the appealability of discovery orders. See Mohawk 
Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 609 (2009) (citing rulemaking as “the preferred means 
for determining whether and when prejudgment orders should be immediately appealable”). 
Professor Scott Dodson rightly characterized this as ironic. See Melinda Hanson, Order to 
Disclose Privileged Material Is Not Subject to Interlocutory Review, 78 U.S.L.W. 1345, 1346 
(2009). 
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The [1934] Act was a brilliant solution to the making of procedural 
law. Described as a treaty between the legislative and judicial 
branches, it provides a dispassionate, neutral forum that allows 
procedural law to be written in a deliberate and thoughtful manner. 
Key members of the Executive Branch (such as the Deputy 
Attorney General and the Solicitor General) have seats on the 
Rules Committees. The openness mandated by Congress invites 
public comment, and new rules are enacted only after approval by 
the Judicial Conference, adoption by the Supreme Court, and after a 
six-month interval while Congress considers whether to permit the 
rules to become law. All of this ensures the rigorous scrutiny and 
public review essential to establish the credibility and legitimacy of 
the rulemaking process.264 
The Court visibly lacks sufficient deference for the other 
branches of the national government or for the Judicial Conference of 
the United States to observe such a treaty. Indeed, that the Advisory 
Committee was fully aware of Judge Easterbrook’s views and had 
decided that the concerns did not justify revision of Rule 8 was 
apparently not a matter of concern to the Court. Perhaps their lack of 
trial and legislative experience has interfered with the Justices’ ability 
to conceptualize the effects of their rulings on actual cases. Other 
recent instances indicate the Justices’ diminished regard for 
subordinate judges and humble jurors selected to assess the 
credibility of evidence.265 Still others confirm the Court’s lack of 
deference to Congress and the legislative process.266 
 
 264. To Speak with One Clear Voice: The Executive Committee’s Role in the Judiciary, 
THIRD BRANCH, Dec. 2009, at 1, 11 (interviewing Chief Judge Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, 
Executive Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States); see also Stempel, supra 
note 29, at 184 (“When rulemaking proceeds by Enabling Act process rather than judicial fiat, a 
substantially more diverse cast of characters participates.”). But see Robert G. Bone, The 
Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 
87 GEO. L.J. 887, 954 (1999) (arguing for a more-centralized rulemaking process by the courts 
and objecting to intrusions by Congress and political interest groups, lamenting that 
“rulemaking today more closely resembles a legislative process . . . than the process of 
principled deliberation it was originally conceived to be”); Richard L. Marcus, Reform Through 
Rulemaking?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 901, 943 (2002) (“Anyone who expects rulemaking to produce 
[monumental] breakthroughs . . . in the new century is going to be disappointed unless dramatic 
change occurs. . . . At the same time, forecasts of doom seem too dire.”). 
 265. See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378–80 (2007) (describing videotape evidence 
presented to the jury, which the Justices themselves watched); see also Kahan et al., supra note 
248, at 839–40 (excerpting portions of oral argument in Scott in which several Justices discussed 
their reactions to the videotape with respondent’s counsel). 
 266. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION’S POWER: THE SUPREME 
COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES 11 (2002) (arguing that the Court has thwarted Congress’s 
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K. Consequences for State Law Enforcement 
Indeed, the Court’s revision of Rule 8 treads on the power of 
state legislatures, too. The celebrated decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins,267 contemporaneous with the promulgation of the Civil 
Rules, noticed the problem that federal common law decisions in 
diversity cases trespassed on state sovereignty. As applied in diversity 
cases, the Court-created Twombly-Iqbal standard will prevent 
discovery by some plaintiffs seeking to serve the public in their 
advancement of civil claims arising under state law.268 
IX.  COMPARE THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT OF 1925 
A. Arbitration Law as Written by Congress 
The Supreme Court’s decisions rewriting the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure—in disregard of the role of other branches of 
government and to protect business interests from the costs 
associated with effective private enforcement of public law—should 
not be viewed in isolation. While the Court was rewriting Rule 56 and 
then Rule 8 (texts that it had promulgated in 1938) to ease the 
concerns of business interests, it was pursuing the same political 
objective in its rewriting of the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 
(FAA).269 
 
legislative authority through an unjustified extension of state immunity); Paul D. Carrington & 
Roger C. Cramton, Judicial Independence in Excess: Reviving the Judicial Duty of the Supreme 
Court, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 587, 590 (2009) (commenting that it is “no wonder that there is 
unrest among citizens mindful of the large political role that the Court has come to perform” 
and proposing to overhaul laws that currently give the Court “virtually absolute control over its 
docket”). 
 267. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“[W]hether the law of the State 
shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a 
matter of federal concern. There is no federal general common law.”). 
 268. Cf. Estate of Tucker v. Interscope Records, Inc., 515 F.3d 1019, 1033 n.14 (9th Cir. 
2008) (finding that mere allegations of malicious prosecution were insufficient, without further 
evidentiary support, to survive a motion for summary judgment in a diversity case). The 
Washington Supreme Court has explicitly declined to adopt the Iqbal standard in reading that 
state’s version of Rule 12(b)(6). See McCurry v. Chevy Chase Bank, FSB, 233 P.3d 861, 864 
(Wash. 2010) (en banc) (“The appropriate forum for revising the Washington rules is the rule-
making process. This process permits policy considerations to be raised, studied, and argued in 
the legal community and the community at large.” (citation omitted)). 
 269. Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (FAA), Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as 
amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006)); see also Paul D. Carrington, Self-Deregulation, the 
“National Policy” of the Supreme Court, 3 NEV. L.J. 259, 264 (2002) (“The instrument of the 
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Congress passed the FAA to foster arbitration of contract 
disputes arising between business firms engaged in interstate 
commerce to reverse a body of federal common law (the body of law 
overruled and dissolved in 1938 in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins) 
that had denied enforcement in federal courts of arbitration 
agreements made prior to the existence of the dispute to be 
arbitrated, often in disregard of the applicable state law of 
contracts.270 As federal and state laws enacted to serve public 
regulatory purposes became more numerous, business interests were 
attracted to arbitration as a means of blunting the force of such laws. 
Arbitration is not an absolute bar to law enforcement, but the citizen 
plaintiff must share the cost of the arbitrator, any factual investigation 
is entirely in the hands of the arbitrator,271 and the arbitrator is not 
accountable for his or her fidelity to the law.272 Firms therefore found 
it attractive to arbitrate private claims arising under state or federal 
regulatory laws. With increasing frequency, firms wrote arbitration 
clauses into the standard form contracts they required workers, 
consumers, investors, patients, or franchisees to sign. 
In 1953, the Court held that an arbitration clause in a brokerage 
agreement is not binding on a plaintiff seeking recovery under the 
 
Court’s mischief has been the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, a statute re-written by the Court 
a half-century after its enactment . . . .”). 
 270. See IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION–
NATIONALIZATION–INTERNATIONALIZATION 122–33 (1992). 
 271. E.g., 9 U.S.C. § 7 (giving the arbitrator the ability to summon witnesses and to compel 
attendance); UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 7 (2000). 
 272. Until 2008, it was widely held that an award might be set aside if it exhibited a 
“manifest disregard of law.” E.g., Kurke v. Oscar Gruss & Son, Inc., 454 F.3d 350, 354 (D.C. Cir. 
2006) (commenting that “manifest disregard” is “an extremely narrow standard of review”). 
And it was assumed that a contract could provide for judicial review of fidelity to law. See, e.g., 
Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir. 1995) (“When, as 
here, the parties agree contractually to subject an arbitration award to expanded judicial review, 
federal arbitration policy demands that the court conduct its review according to the terms of 
the arbitration contract.”). That assumption was laid to rest in Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, 
Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008). There, the Court held that the FAA provides the exclusive statutory 
grounds for judicial review of arbitration awards and may not be supplemented by contract. Id. 
at 1400; see also Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 355 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[T]o 
the extent that manifest disregard of the law constitutes a nonstatutory ground for vacatur, it is 
no longer a basis for vacating awards under the FAA.”); Tom Ginsburg, The Arbitrator as 
Agent: Why Deferential Review Is Not Always Pro-Arbitration 8–9 (Univ. of Chicago Law Sch., 
John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 502 (2d Series), 2009), available at 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/502-tg-arbitrator.pdf (noting that Hall Street “explicitly 
rejects” the position that judges can “expand their monitoring of the arbitrator-agents simply 
because the party-principals want them to”). 
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Securities Act of 1933.273 That decision was widely approved and 
taken to apply to claims advanced to enforce other laws enacted by 
Congress.274 The Court did not preclude private arbitration between 
parties reaching agreement to arbitrate an existing dispute, but it was 
mindful that arbitrators may not be held accountable for their fidelity 
to legislation invoked by plaintiffs and are not accountable for failing 
to investigate pertinent facts. 
B. The Court Rewrites the Act 
In 1984, the Supreme Court for the first time held that the 1925 
FAA could be invoked to bar a California state court from enforcing 
California’s Franchise Investment Act, which would have invalidated 
an arbitration clause in a standard-form franchise agreement.275 And 
in 1989, the Court explicitly overruled its own 1953 decision to hold 
 
 273. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (“Recognizing the advantages that prior 
agreements for arbitration may provide for the solution of commercial controversies, we decide 
that the intention of Congress concerning the sale of securities is better carried out by holding 
invalid such an agreement for arbitration of issues arising under the [Securities] Act.”), 
overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989). The 
Wilko Court relied on language in the Securities Act declaring void any “‘stipulation’ waiving 
compliance with any ‘provision’ of the Securities Act.” Id. at 434. In reaching its conclusion, the 
Court appeared to follow the position taken by the Securities and Exchange Commission in its 
amicus brief. See Brief for the SEC, Amicus Curiae at 18, Wilko, 346 U.S. 427 (No. 39). The 
Court and lower courts have adopted similar reasoning in the context of other statutes. See, e.g., 
Boyd v. Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co., 338 U.S. 263, 264–65 (1949) (per curiam) (holding that 
contractual clauses limiting the plaintiff’s choice of venue in a suit under the Federal Employers’ 
Liability Act were voided by the Act’s provisions); Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & 
Co., 391 F.2d 821, 828 (2d Cir. 1968) (concluding that the antitrust claims raised by the plaintiff 
were “inappropriate for arbitration” despite the existence of an arbitration clause). But see 
Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 138 F.2d 3, 6–7 (3d Cir. 1943) (“[W]e see nothing in the 
wording of the Fair Labor Standards Act which precludes arbitration of claims arising under 
it.”). 
 274. See, e.g., In re Arbitration Between AAACON Auto Transp., Inc & State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 537 F.2d 648, 654–55 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that the Interstate Commerce Act 
preserved a shipper’s right to sue a carrier in any proper forum under that Act, and that the Act 
therefore voided any contractual limitations on venue); Am. Safety Equip. Corp., 391 F.2d at 
828 (declining to consider the plaintiff’s antitrust claims as being among those situations in 
which “Congress has allowed parties to obtain the advantages of arbitration”). 
 275. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (“In creating a substantive rule 
applicable in state as well as federal courts, Congress intended to foreclose state legislative 
attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements.” (footnote omitted)). The 
state law in question was CAL. CORP. CODE § 31512. In 1995, the Supreme Court extended its 
application of the FAA to preempt an Alabama law protecting consumers from mandatory 
arbitration clauses in standard form contracts. See Allied Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 
U.S. 265, 281 (1995) (“What states may not do is decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce 
all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause. 
The Act makes any such state policy unlawful . . . .”). 
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that the FAA empowered brokers to compel their investors to 
arbitrate claims arising under federal securities laws.276 The Court 
went on to apply the principle to other federal laws.277 
An arbitrator might investigate facts in dispute when a citizen 
seeks to enforce the law enacted for his protection, and the arbitrator 
might elect to enforce the applicable law, but an arbitrator is also free 
to choose to do otherwise.278 I have heard that those providing 
arbitration services offer reassurances that private citizens required to 
arbitrate win a higher percentage of their cases than in litigation. A 
possible explanation for that fact, if it is a fact, is that the upfront 
charge for the cost of arbitration and the absence of the right to 
discovery deter plaintiffs from filing any but the most assured claims. 
Indeed, if it were true that plaintiffs win more readily in arbitration, 
few businesses would write arbitration clauses into their standard 
form contracts. 
Also, arbitration is a private proceeding. One of its attractions to 
predatory or risk-taking businesses is that it diminishes the likelihood 
that the success of one claim by a consumer, employee, or investor 
will encourage others like it. Evidence revealed to an arbitrator 
remains private. Whereas a public enforcement proceeding serves to 
alert the general public to the need for regulation and enables the 
public to measure the usefulness of its legal institutions, secret 
proceedings conceal from the public not only the risk of the harm at 
issue but also the awareness that the public interest is being served by 
the law enforcement efforts of fellow citizens.279 
This history of federal arbitration law since the mid-1980s tends 
to confirm that the Supreme Court’s revisions of the Civil Rules have 
a clearly visible political aim: to protect business firms from 
 
 276. See Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 484 (“We now conclude that Wilko was incorrectly 
decided and is inconsistent with the prevailing uniform construction of other federal statutes 
governing arbitration agreements in the setting of business transactions.”). This overruling was 
foretold in Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). There, the Court 
commented that it was “difficult to reconcile Wilko’s mistrust of the arbitral process with this 
Court’s subsequent decisions involving the Arbitration Act. . . . Indeed, most of the reasons 
given in Wilko have been rejected subsequently by the Court as a basis for holding claims to be 
nonarbitrable.” Id. at 231–32. 
 277. See, e.g., Allied Bruce Terminix Cos., 513 U.S. at 281. 
 278. See supra notes 271–74. 
 279. Adriaan Lanni, Note, Protecting Public Rights in Private Arbitration, 107 YALE L.J. 
1157, 1161 (1999) (arguing that confidential arbitration proceedings pose such “significant 
dangers” as diminished deterrence, lack of uniformity in industry standards, and stunted 
development in the law). 
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unwelcome private law enforcement. Never mind contrary legal 
texts—whether enacted directly by Congress, promulgated by the 
Court itself on the advice of the Judicial Conference and with the 
tacit approval of Congress, or enacted by state legislatures to assure 
the effective enforcement of state law. 
Congress, under the leadership of Senator Orrin Hatch, has 
intervened to protect the rights of automobile dealers to enforce the 
Automobile Dealers Day in Court Act.280 And under the leadership of 
Senator Chuck Grassley, Congress has assured the right of farmers to 
opt out of arbitration clauses written into their printed contracts with 
firms that buy their produce.281 But much state and federal law is less 
vigorously enforced as a result of the Court’s decisions.282 
C. Rewriting Rules of Evidence 
Meanwhile, the Court has also rewritten the Federal Rules of 
Evidence to weaken and perhaps nullify federal laws dependent for 
their enforcement on the use of expert opinion. District judges are to 
exclude expert testimony that, on the basis of their personal scientific 
expertise, they deem unreliable.283 Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence was amended in 2000 in an attempt to codify the Court’s 
rulings.284 The admission of expert testimony under that rule is highly 
 
 280. 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorizations Act, Pub. L. No. 
107-273, div. C, tit. I, § 11028, 116 Stat. 1758, 1835 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1226 (2006)). 
 281. See Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, § 11005, 122 
Stat. 1651, 2119 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 197c (Supp. II 2008)) (requiring any 
livestock or poultry contract containing an arbitration provision to give the grower a meaningful 
opportunity to decline to be bound by that provision). 
 282. See, e.g., Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-
67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.). This statute 
was passed over the veto of President Clinton, who expressed concern that the bill would “have 
the effect of closing the courthouse door on investors who have legitimate claims.” 141 CONG. 
REC. 37,797 (1995). 
 283. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–93 (1993) (concluding that 
the district judge has the responsibility, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, to make a 
“preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the [expert’s] 
testimony is scientifically valid”); see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 
(1999) (concluding that Daubert’s assignment of a “gatekeeping” duty to the district court judge 
applies not only to scientific testimony but also to testimony based on other technical and 
specialized knowledge); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143 (1997) (clarifying that the 
trial court’s determination of the scientific validity of expert testimony is to be reviewed under 
an abuse of discretion standard, and holding that the appeals court’s scrutiny of the district court 
was overly stringent). 
 284. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment (2000); see also 
Guy v. Crown Equip. Corp., 394 F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Amended Rule 702 reflects the 
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discretionary and dependent on the judge’s scientific competence.285 
Review of such rulings in the courts of appeals is, to say the least, 
problematic,286 and this empowerment has contributed measurably to 
the rise in summary judgments dismissing plaintiffs’ cases.287 One 
effect of this reform is to magnify the political consequences of the 
Court’s efforts to diminish access to discovery.288 
For example, the enforcement of some federal laws regulating 
business may depend on expert economic opinions that can be 
secured only from experts fully informed of the defendant’s case. The 
Bank Merger Act,289 a law connecting banking and antitrust law, is a 
timely example of a federal law that may have been nullified by the 
Court’s rewriting of the law of evidence to require unavailable 
expertise. Whether less constrained enforcement of the Act might 
have diminished the impact of the 2008 economic crisis is a question 
that may be worthy of consideration. 
D. A Captured Court 
Perhaps it is not an overstatement to say that the Supreme 
Court, as much in its reinterpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act 
as in its rewrite of the Civil Rules, appears to have been captured by 
business interests—much like many public regulatory agencies were 
captured, making citizens increasingly dependent on the system of 
effective private law enforcement that emerged from the 1934 Act 
 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Daubert and its progeny emphasizing the district courts’ broad 
latitude in weighing the reliability of expert testimony for admissibility.”). 
 285. See Sheilah Jasanoff, Law’s Knowledge: Science for Justice in Legal Settings, 95 AM. J. 
PUB. HEALTH S49, S50 (2005) (observing a “disenchantment in contemporary America with the 
law’s capacity to resolve the manifold technical disputes of modernity”). 
 286. See, e.g., Huss v. Gayden, 585 F.3d 823, 824 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (Owen, C.J., 
concurring) (describing the disagreement between the panel majority and the dissents over 
whether the district judge had erred in excluding an expert’s testimony on general, rather than 
specific, causation). 
 287. See LLOYD DIXON & BRIAN GILL, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CHANGES IN THE 
STANDARDS FOR ADMITTING EXPERT EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES SINCE THE 
DAUBERT DECISION 55–57 (2001) (noting an increase in summary judgments arising out of 
challenges to expert evidence in the wake of Daubert). 
 288. PROJECT ON SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE & PUB. POLICY, DAUBERT: THE MOST 
INFLUENTIAL SUPREME COURT RULING YOU’VE NEVER HEARD OF 3 (2003) (“In the 
aftermath of Daubert, not only are many legitimate scientists and their work being barred from 
the courtroom, but plaintiffs are being denied their day in court, unfairly in our view.”). 
 289. Act of May 13, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-463, 74 Stat. 129, amended by Act of Feb. 21, 1966, 
Pub. L. No. 89-356, 80 Stat. 7. 
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and its political premises.290 I believe it is fair to say that the Roberts 
Court since 2007 has set for itself the political goals advanced a 
quarter century earlier by Vice President Quayle’s Commission 
without noting that the Commission was addressing its deregulatory 
recommendations to Congress, not to the Court. And it is not an 
overstatement to say that the Court has in these decisions manifested 
judicial activism of just the sort that conservative politicians have so 
vigorously decried.291 It might be said that the Roberts Court appears 
as the Quayle Commission on Competitiveness in robes. 
X.  PRESCRIPTIONS 
The Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal 
System, a think tank established in 2006, has chimed in with a 
proposal of Civil Caseflow Management Guidelines292 and a set of 
proposed Pilot Project Rules to which the name of the American 
College of Trial Lawyers is also attached.293 Veteran litigators J. 
Douglas Richards and John Vail have expressed skepticism, making 
 
 290. See Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court Inc., N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 16, 2008, at 38, 42. 
Capture was further confirmed by Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 
876 (2010), which held that corporations have a First Amendment right to fund political 
campaigns. Id. at 898. As Timothy Kuhner observed in 2007, the separation of church and state 
was the primary aim of the First Amendment; yet the Court now invokes that text to forbid laws 
striving to separate business and state. See Timothy K. Kuhner, The Separation of Business and 
State, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2374 (2007) (“Formal separation limits the amount of control 
religious authorities can exercise. The absence of formal separation with regard to monetary 
influence is damning in this precise regard.”); see also Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private 
Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183, 209 (“The current Court is creating an ever-greater 
regulation-remedy gap. It has left Congress free to regulate a wide range of subjects, but it is 
engaged in a form of court stripping that reduces the possibilities for judicial enforcement of 
statutory commands.”). 
 291. See REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., 2008 REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 19 (2008), available at 
http://www.gop.com/2008Platform/2008platform.pdf (“Judicial activism is a grave threat to the 
rule of law because unaccountable federal judges are usurping democracy, ignoring the 
Constitution and its separation of powers, and imposing their personal opinions upon the 
public.”). This may be a misuse of the term “judicial activism.” See Siegel, supra note 222, at 556 
(suggesting that “the rhetoric of judicial activism is deployed to condemn particular views on 
particular issues and not to express a genuine commitment to judicial deference or to the ideal 
of fidelity to law”); cf. David E. Bernstein, Liberals, Conservatives, and Individual Rights, CATO 
INST. (June 27, 2008), http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=9511 (citing examples of 
conservative support for invalidating regulations and arguing that a commitment to individual 
civil liberties is not monopolized by any particular ideological bloc on the Court). 
 292. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., CIVIL CASEFLOW 
MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES (2009). 
 293. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS. & AM. COLL. OF TRIAL 
LAWYERS, PILOT PROJECT RULES (2009). 
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the not-groundless claim that the facts on the ground do not justify 
reforms on the scale proposed by the Institute.294 
I agree with Richards and Vail that the case has not been made 
for radical departure from the scheme established in 1938. To be sure, 
times have changed. But the proposed Pilot Project Rules, like the 
decisions of the Court in Twombly and Iqbal, seem to be derived not 
from observable reality but from a political ideology that is resistant 
to private enforcement of public law and therefore favored by the 
Chamber of Commerce. Indeed, there was nothing in either Twombly 
or Iqbal that had not been considered and rejected repeatedly by the 
Advisory Committee, among others.295 
Professor Arthur Miller has thoughtfully prescribed diverse 
actions for the Advisory Committee to consider as possible revivals of 
the Civil Rules.296 But the present rulemaking system cannot alone 
correct what the Supreme Court has done to impair the effective 
enforcement of the substantive laws made by Congress or the states. 
Given the role of the Court in the rulemaking legislative process as 
established by the 1934 Act, there is simply not much that the 
Advisory Committee or the Judicial Conference can reasonably be 
expected to do. To restate the law of pleading as expressed in 
Twombly and Iqbal would require a repudiation of the premises of 
the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 and the antecedent thoughts on 
procedural law reform dating from Bentham, Field, and Pound. 
 
 294. J. Douglas Richards & John Vail, A Misguided Mission to Revamp the Rules, TRIAL, 
Nov. 2009, at 52, 52–54. 
 295. Steven Burbank observed, 
  Nor do I think it was fortuitous that the Court proceeded by judicial decision 
rather than by remitting the issues to the Enabling Act process. As the head of the 
latter the Chief Justice was well aware that the Civil Rules Committee had raised and 
abandoned the possibility of amending the pleading rules a number of times, 
including in the recent past. Moreover, one of the reasons for the committee’s serial 
inaction—that any amendment tightening pleading would be politically controversial 
and thus likely to arouse strong opposition in Congress—can only have encouraged 
the Court to proceed as it did, particularly with a Democratic Congress. 
  It is precisely because these decisions represent an attempted power grab by the 
Court in direct contravention of the process prescribed by Congress that I have 
advocated legislation that would return federal pleading law to the status quo ante 
until such time as amendments to the Federal Rules are proposed through the 
Enabling Act process, subject to review by Congress. 
Steven Burbank, Remarks to the Constitution Society (Feb. 24, 2010) (on file with the Duke 
Law Journal). 
 296. Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 103–27 (2010). 
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It is therefore past time for Congress to address the issues 
presented to the Advisory Committee in 1985 and now elevated to 
urgency by the Court’s holding in Iqbal. I therefore offer my 
unqualified endorsement to the Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 
2009297 as proposed by Senator Specter and others. Or, better, to 
Professor Stephen Burbank’s proposal.298 Or the Open Access Act 
proposed by Representative Jerrold Nadler.299 Or possibly Professor 
Martin Redish’s more radical proposal to have the Judicial 
Conference report directly to Congress, with such advice as the Court 
might wish to contribute.300 Surely Redish is correct that the 
responsibility for making nontranssubstantive law is constitutionally 
vested in Congress, not the Court. If, for example, there is to be a 
different standard for summary judgment or motions for judgment on 
the pleadings applicable to antitrust cases, the institution to 
promulgate such a law was and is Congress, not the Court. 
One is moved to be cautious in engaging Congress in the politics 
of procedural rulemaking. Alas, in another of its activist ventures as 
the champion of business interests, the Court has assured the right of 
those with money to dominate the election of legislators at all levels 
of government.301 I do not suppose that Congressman Kastenmeier 
was a victim of generous business contributions to the campaign of his 
adversary, but it would be no surprise to learn that some 
congresspersons in 2010 would take the risk of well-funded 
opposition into account before considering rules of civil procedure 
that might enhance the ability of citizens to enforce laws regulating 
business. 
Perhaps the Advisory Committee might be summoned to serve 
Congress as a consultant in a search for an enactment that might 
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bring the Court back to the mission of enforcing the rights of citizens, 
as expressed by generations of law reformers and embodied in the 
Rules Enabling Act of 1934, without arousing great anxieties of great 
funders of political campaigns. Might Congress, for example, 
empower the Court to certify to the Judicial Conference questions 
about procedural rules and their possible need for reconsideration or 
revision in a transparent and representative process? Would such 
empowerment, by providing the Court with a self-effacing method of 
addressing the politics of civil procedure, help the Court to find its 
way back home to an appropriately modest role in the constitutional 
scheme? It might be worth a try. Whatever the best prescription, 
Congress must act or many of its laws will go down the drain of weak 
enforcement that the Court has opened. 
